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Abstract 
The research on home and community care shows that when safely delivered it can be an 
efficient way to support elders who require care, potentially preventing a move into costlier 
institutional care. Learning from system-wide safety breakdowns that occur is necessary to 
establish appropriate prevention strategies. The purpose of this study was to identify the 
factors that contributed to adverse events in care-dependent community-dwelling older adults 
and their caregivers. Using a multiple case study methodology, eight falls were investigated 
using a comprehensive Systemic Falls Investigative Method. Using within case and across 
case analyses, a total of 280 contributing factors were identified, and grouped in four distinct 
themes of safety deficiencies: Everyday living has become risky, Limitations with 
supervision, Disconnects within the system, and Poor fall risk identification and follow-up. 
This study provides insights into how and why adverse events occur in home and community 
care, allowing for targeted systemic improvements. 
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
Many older adults wish to “age in place”, referring to the desire to remain in one’s own 
home, surrounded by familiar belongings and familiar routines, as functional abilities decline 
during the aging process. Helping older adults age in place safely is beneficial to the 
healthcare system as well. On average, institutional care is costlier than home care (Miller, 
Hollander, & MacAdam, 2008). Many older adults are able to live on their own. Over half of 
elders over 85 years of age still live independently, with only 33.2% of elders over 85 years 
of age residing in long term care (LTC); 88% of adults who are between 65-75years of age 
are independent with activities of daily living (ADLs); this decreases to 41% for those over 
85 years of age (Institute for Life Course and Aging, 2007). The rapidly increasing 
demographic group of individuals over 65 years of age and especially the fastest growing 
group of those over 80 years (Statistics Canada, 2010), will translate into increased numbers 
of people requiring care and support as they age (Turcotte & Schellenberg, 2006). Within the 
home and community environment, this care assistance can come from family and friends, 
formal home care agencies, or not-for-profit organizations. Assistance within the home 
provides support to individuals who require help with daily functional tasks, such as 
dressing, bathing and meal preparation, or to those individuals who need professional health 
care for recovery after an illness or a hospital stay. Care within the home can also support 
those who require help for maintenance of current functional abilities or for slowing down 
the functional decline related to chronic degenerative conditions.  
Most individuals will age in place safely, but adverse events (AEs) can occur. Health-
related safety in the home and community is defined “as the minimization of the probability 
of preventable, unintended harm in community-dwelling individuals. Health-related safety 
aims to understand how and why adverse health events occur and to identify what 
breakdowns in the societal system expose individuals to hazards” (Lau, Scandrett, 
Jarzebowski, Holman, & Emanual, 2007, pp. 840-841). These preventable events can 
threaten an individual’s ability to age in place successfully and without harm. 
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Although patient safety within hospitals has been addressed in a variety of ways, 
individuals being cared for in the community have been included but not specifically 
addressed in the patient safety discussions. This is changing, as demonstrated by the 
Canadian Patient Safety Institute’s report Safety in home care: Broadening the patient safety 
agenda to include home care services (Lang & Edwards, 2006). As home based care delves 
into patient safety, it will be important to keep systemic and human factors in the forefront. 
Older adults aging in place are supported by many different people and outside agencies, 
often with their own distinct guiding policies and procedures, or, in the case of informal 
caregivers, no formal guidelines. Each person brings a mix of his or her own abilities and 
weaknesses, areas of experience and inexperience, biases and habits, in short— the human 
factors.  
Preventing AEs will involve taking a close look at all the issues that link together to 
culminate in an undesirable event.  Incidents and accidents are never the result of a single 
factor (Reason, 1990). Identification of the combination of factors that contributed to the AE 
may lead to an understanding of systemic problems and may allow for more targeted 
prevention of unnecessary harm. Targeted prevention has the potential to increase the safety 
and well-being of many community dwelling older adults and their caregivers, allowing for 
successful ageing in place, and reducing unnecessary healthcare expenditures. This thesis 
utilizes a systemic investigation method to take a closer look at the factors that contributed to 
AEs and to report findings that will guide future improvements of safety for community 
dwelling older persons aging in place. 
1.1 Literature Review 
1.1.1 Care Within the Home 
Staying home with an increased level of support is preferred by older adults over the 
alternative of moving into a long term care (LTC) facility (Carstairs & Keon, 2009). The 
need for increased support is not inevitable as one becomes older, but the percentage who 
require help with activities of daily living (ADLs) increases as these individuals become 
older and potentially frailer (Kart & Kinney, 2001; Smith, 2001). Supports for those desiring 
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to age in place can come from formal homecare agencies (providers), family and friends 
(informal caregivers), and not-for-profit agencies. 
1.1.1.1 Formal Homecare 
Formal Homecare services (which will be Homecare with a capital for the purposes of this 
thesis) offer supports that allow an individual to remain living in the community and prevent 
admission to a LTC. Homecare services are designed to supplement the care older adults are 
able to provide for themselves or to supplement the assistance provided by family and 
friends. Homecare programs and services offered in each region throughout Canada are not 
standardized, but generally services include nursing care, services from allied health 
professionals (most often dieticians, occupational therapists, physical therapists, and social 
workers), and non-medical home support services. The non-medical home support services 
are usually provided by personal support workers (PSWs).  PSWs can be assigned to assist 
with activities of daily living (ADLs), such as bathing, dressing, grooming, toileting, and 
transfers, and a few instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs), such as basic home 
cleaning, meal preparation, and laundry. The provision of equipment such as hospital beds, 
commodes, and transfers aids is often funded on a short term basis. The amount and type of 
non-medical home support services funded by the provincial government and eligibility 
requirements vary throughout Canada and within each province. For example, in 
Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Quebec the cost of Homecare services are not to exceed the 
cost of LTC (Canadian Home Care Association, 2008). In Ontario, Prince Edward Island and 
Nova Scotia’s acute care program, guidelines are in place predefining the amount of dollars 
or the number of hours allowed per individual. In British Columbia, Nunavut, and the North 
West Territories there is no established maximum limit.   
Most Homecare services within Ontario are delivered by agencies contracted to a 
local Community Care Access Centre (CCAC), some of which are for profit agencies, and 
others of which are not-for-profit agencies. Each agency is required to follow the 
requirements and regulations set out by the region’s CCAC. The CCAC is overseen by a 
Local Health Integration Network (LHIN), which receives funding from the provincial 
Ministry of Health. The LHIN provides a budgeted amount of money to the CCAC each year 
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and gives guidance for how the money is expected to be spent. The CCAC assigns a case 
manager to each client on the Homecare program, and the case manager determines which 
type and the frequency of services the client will receive based on the Resident Assessment 
Instrument for Home Care (RAI-HC). The RAI-HC is a standardized assessment tool that is 
completed face to face with clients, within six weeks of admission to the program. The tool 
has domains related to function, health, social support, and service. All case managers 
receive standardized training on this tool and use the results of the RAI-HC to inform and 
guide the planning of the amount of home services to be contracted from outside agencies. 
Case managers are directly employed by CCAC. 
The importance of home based care within the healthcare system has become 
increasingly evident as healthcare costs increase.  In 1996 healthcare expenditures per capita 
was just over $2 500; in 2010 this had increased to $5 659 per capita (Canadian Institute for 
Health Information (CIHI), 2012; Ontario Health Quality Council (OHQC), 2010). Even with 
a constant dollar rate to account for inflation, the comparable cost per capita in 2012 was 
over $4 000.  According to the CIHI’s online cost estimator (http://www.cihi.ca/cihi-ext-
portal/internet/en/applicationnew/spending+and+health+workforce/spending/cihi020209), 
the average cost for a patient who is in the hospital and awaiting placement into LTC was $8 
499 . The average cost for one day in an Ontario hospital was $842 (in 2011,) and it was 
estimated that 16% of hospital beds are occupied by individuals requiring an alternate level 
of care (i.e., LTC) (Ontario Home Care Association, 2011). Frequently it is the need for non-
medical services that prompts the move of these individuals to LTC (Chen & Thompson, 
2010; Williams et al., 2009). It may be possible to meet the same level of care within the 
home environment, with the appropriate amount of Homecare (Ontario Health Quality 
Council, 2010; Williams et al., 2009).  
Supporting individuals at home is to the advantage of the healthcare system., Miller 
and her colleagues reported that on average the cost of provincially funded Homecare was six 
times less than the cost of LTC, which is supplemented by the province ($9 104/person/year 
versus $65 175/person/year) (Miller et al., 2008). Even when the (minimum) wage 
replacement for informal caregiving and other expenses to the family were taken into 
account, the comparable cost was $37 008/person/year for community care and $87 
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376/person/year for facility care. Utilizing Homecare services to replace alternate levels of 
care in the hospital and LTC has the potential to save the Ontario healthcare system $150 
million each year (VanderBent & Kutcha, 2010). However, although the cost efficiency of 
Homecare for the healthcare system is evident, it also should be kept in mind that the lower 
cost of Homecare is partially based on the support provided by informal, unpaid caregivers.   
1.1.1.2 Informal Caregivers 
The support of informal caregivers is essential for older adults to remain in their home 
successfully in advanced old age. According to the CIHI (2010) only 2% of those receiving 
Homecare manage without any additional informal care. Non-medical home support services 
provided through the Ontario Ministry of Health are usually not sufficient to meet all of the 
needs of an older adult who wishes to age in place. Moreover, an individual’s specific care 
needs may not qualify for government covered services. In those situations it takes the efforts 
of unpaid, informal caregivers, such as spouses, children, grandchildren, siblings, other 
family members, friends, and neighbours to fully support the person and prevent 
institutionalization (Miller et al., 2008). An estimated 80% of assisted support within the 
home is provided by unpaid caregivers (CIHI, 2010), who often do not have previous 
experience in healthcare (Lang, Edwards, & Fleiszer, 2008; MacDonald & Storch, 2010).  
Caregiving often begins with small IADL related tasks, and gradually grows.  The 
role is often assumed due to love, marriage, family ties, friendship, or out of a feeling of 
obligation, when there is no one else to provide assistance (Dow & McDonald, 2007; 
MacDonald & Storch, 2010). Many caregivers are unaware of the future requirements of 
such a role and the potential for slow, exponential growth of their responsibilities 
(MacDonald & Storch, 2010). Over time this can create stress related decrease in the 
caregiver’s health, increased risk of depression, and increased physical pain (CIHI, 2010; 
Dow & McDonald, 2007; MacDonald & Storch, 2010; Ranmuthugala, Nepal, Brown, & 
Percival, 2009), especially if caregiver’s capabilities and limitations are not taken into 
consideration (Henriksen, Joseph, & Zayas-Caba, 2009; National Research Council, 2011). 
In Miller et al.’s (2008) study, 53% of the caregivers for veterans were over the age of 65, 
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and 40% were over the age of 70. It is also vital, therefore, to take caregivers’ limitations into 
account because older caregivers often have health issues and care needs of their own.  
Caregivers are essential for help in and around an elder’s home. They provide 
assistance with grass cutting, snow shoveling, and grocery shopping, as well as personal care 
such as bathing, dressing, transfers, and medication management. Informal caregivers also 
provide emotional support, monitor the needs of the care recipient, and coordinate the formal, 
paid care providers within the home (Williams et al., 2009). According to CIHI, caregivers in 
Canada provide an average of 18.4 hours of care each week (CIHI, 2010). The estimated 
market value of informal caregiving for adults over the age of 65 years is $25-26 billion per 
year within the province of Ontario alone (Miller et al., 2008). Caregivers play an important 
role in the success of care within the home, allowing older adults to remain in the community 
and reducing healthcare system costs.  
1.1.1.3 Not-for-Profit Agencies 
Not-for-profit agencies provide services that enable older adults and their caregivers to 
continue with care in the home. The agencies often rely on volunteers and include programs 
such as meals on wheels, friendly visitor programs, transportation to medical appointments, 
care giver support groups, day programs, and library book exchange. Program fees are kept 
to a minimum to allow for increased accessibility and are often subsidized by government 
grants, fund raising, and public donations. The Alzheimer Society, Red Cross, and Victorian 
Order of Nurses (VON) are some examples of not-for-profit agencies that provide 
programming to assist older adults with aging in place. 
1.1.2 Safety of Care-Dependent Older Adults in the Home and 
Community 
Harmful incidents or adverse events increase the use of healthcare resources and increase 
costs to the healthcare system as a whole.  Beyond healthcare dollar utilization, AEs have 
personal consequences to the health, well-being, and life potential of those experiencing the 
AE (Smartrisk, 2009). The term “adverse event” has been defined within healthcare safety 
literature in different ways, as described in Appendix A. For the purpose of this study an 
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adverse event (AE) is defined as ‘an unintentional event that could have resulted, or did 
result, in unnecessary preventable harm’. The prevention of these events, whether harmful or 
not, is in the best interest of the healthcare system and older adults.   
Baker et al. (2004) produced one of the first reports with AE rates within the 
Canadian healthcare system. He examined the rates of AEs within hospitals, finding an AE 
rate of 7.5%. Lang and Edwards (2006) proposed expanding the studies of patient safety to 
include home care. The authors identified 10 themes that describe differences between safety 
in hospital care and home based care: 1) family is the unit of care; 2) safety of the client, 
family, caregivers, and providers is linked; 3) the setting of individual homes is unregulated 
and uncontrolled; 4) there are multiple dimensions of safety within the home setting 
(physical, emotional, social, and functional); 5) the role of autonomy and choice for clients, 
families, and caregivers; 6) isolation is a factor for clients as well as families and caregivers; 
7) communication breakdowns between provider and client as well as between providers; 8) 
the maintenance and development of knowledge, skill, and competence for providers; 9) the 
changing focus of home care services from prevention, health promotion, and chronic care to 
more acute service provision; and 10) the human resource challenges.  Addressing safety 
within home care is more complex than it is within hospitals. 
In 2006, Lang and Edwards (2006) stated “there is an urgent need for research on 
safety in home care” (p. 27). Consecutive studies have moved onto examining safety and 
prevalence of AEs within the formal home care system (Doran et al., 2009; Johnson, 2006; 
Madigan, 2007; Masotti, Green, Shortt, Hunter, & Szala-Meneoak, 2007; Sears, 2008). 
Appendix B contains a comparative table of one hospital and five home care studies that 
examined prevalence of AEs in health care. Reported AE rates varied from 5.5% to 13.2%. 
The variation was most likely due to the different inclusion/exclusion criteria for the case 
files reviewed and the inclusion/exclusion criteria of the AE categories used.  Both Johnson 
(2006) and Sears (2008) reported that almost 30% of the events examined in their studies 
were preventable (26.9% and 32.7% respectively).  Of the AEs identified in the Canadian 
studies, the most prevalent were related to falls (24.6%-61%) and medications (16.4%-23.1 
%). Doran et al. (2009) found that 11% of the 238 958 cases reviewed had experienced a new 
fall; that is 26 285 falls.  
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Falls can occur at any time of life, but the risk of injury after a fall was nine times 
greater when a person was over the age of 65 years (Smartrisk, 2009).  Peel (2011) reviewed 
15 studies examining falls in older community dwelling adults and found that the prevalence 
rates for participants who had a fall in the past year varied from 19.3% up to 60%, where the 
oldest old had the highest rates. The accumulated effects of aging and co-morbidities 
(intrinsic factors) increase an older adult’s susceptibility to environmental (extrinsic) factors. 
Consequences of falls cost the Canadian healthcare system $2 billion dollars in direct care 
costs in 2004 (Smartrisk, 2009).  
Inappropriate medications and medication mismanagement are costly, leading to a 
1.5-2 times increased risk of a greater number of physician and emergency room (ER) visits 
(Fick, Mion, Beers, & Waller, 2008). Adverse drug reactions account for 4% of hospital bed 
capacities, with an eight day hospital stay on average (Pirmohamed et al., 2004). Over 35% 
of those over the age of 60 are taking more than five medications, with polypharmacy leading 
to increased adverse drug reactions that result in falls, declined functional capacity, and 
decreased cognition (Geller, Nopkhun, Dows-Martinez, & Strassor, 2012).  
Decreasing AEs would have many benefits for the healthcare system and for those 
who experience them. Preventing these events requires identification of the factors that 
contributed to the incident.  
1.1.3 Contributing Factors to Adverse Events 
A better understanding of the factors that contribute to AEs is needed to improve safety and 
decrease the chances of a harmful incident occurring to care recipients or their caregivers 
(Doran et al., 2009; Masotti, McColl, & Green, 2010; Sears, 2008). Older adults, and those 
that care for them, are a heterogeneous group of individuals with varying skills, knowledge 
levels, abilities, and disabilities. Due to normal aging process all older adults experience 
some degree of decreased strength, decreased balance, decreased endurance, and decreased 
vision (Cox, 2006). This affects how they are able to manage caring for themselves and their 
ability to manage carrying out instructions given to them from healthcare providers, such as 
the doctor and nurse. In addition, each home environment is different, potentially enabling or 
hindering the completion of daily tasks. Caregivers and care providers comes into the older 
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adult’s home with their own experiences and areas of expertise, as well as gaps in expertise. 
If care demands “exceed a person’s capabilities, the safety, efficacy and efficiency of that 
care will suffer” (National Research Council, 2011, p. 1). Due to the multiple players 
involved, human capabilities and limitations—also known as the human factors, are another 
of the multiple factors affecting safety for care-dependent individuals who are aging in place 
and their formal and informal caregivers.  
Research on safety in the Homecare system has attributed AEs to multiple 
contributing factors. Johnson (2006) found that 30.8% of the AEs were client related, 42.3 % 
were caregiver related, 50% were associated with case manager issues such as not 
introducing services in a timely manner, and 4.3 % were physician related. Sears (2008) 
found that 29.5% of AEs were related to home care workers, 27.9% involved caregivers, and 
52.6% events involved the care receiver (self-care). Sears reported that the majority of AE 
related deaths reported in her study were related to the actions of the care recipient and 
caregiver. The participants in Masotti et al.’s 2007 study identified a number of factors that 
may contribute to the occurrence of AEs. Factors such as communication problems, clients 
with complex needs, insufficient training, inappropriate home environments, delays in 
service, moving care responsibility to clients and caregivers, failure to identify and control 
for risks, use and misuse of equipment, and insufficient human and financial resources. The 
work of Masotti and colleagues (2007) moved the focus from the individuals at “fault” to 
broader systemic issues.  
In a more recent study, Masotti et al. (2010) identified patient-level as well as 
organizational and system-level characteristics associated with causes and increased risk for 
AEs. Patient-level causes included increased age and co-morbidities, gender, 
depression/cognitive impairment/functional status limitations, patient compliance, and living 
alone or not having a caregiver. Organizational and system-level characteristics included 
communication issues and collaboration, team experience, team workload, medication errors, 
unrecognized polypharmacy, drug label instructions, inadequate patient monitoring, and 
assessment. Authors concluded that preventing or reducing AEs would require targeted multi-
level changes and further research. One area of future research suggested was to examine the 
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“multi-level variables associated with the occurrence of adverse events (e.g. 
patient/provider/system-level variables associated with causes and consequences)” (p. 121). 
The majority of research studies identified contributing factors based on retrospective 
chart reviews and opinions of home healthcare experts. These methods are insufficient to 
provide a full, thorough investigation of contributing factors due to hindsight bias, which 
affects how a situation is viewed after the fact when an outcome is known.  This bias causes 
people to overestimate what they knew before an incident and to overestimate what others 
may have known beforehand (Woods & Cook, 1999). Without a thorough investigation 
method that acknowledges hindsight bias, investigators and researchers completing case 
chart reviews run the risk of believing that the individuals directly involved at the time of the 
incident knew more than they actually did or were aware of more about their situation than 
they actually were. To ensure there is comprehensive identification of the contributing factors 
that linked together and affected one another to result in the AE, a thorough reflective 
investigation that involves interviewing the individuals affected and the others involved is 
necessary.   
1.2 Systems Approach to Investigation of Adverse Events 
A system is a set of interdependent elements interacting to achieve a common goal (Institute 
of Medicine (IOM), 1999). The elements of a societal system may be human or non-human, 
consisting of people, places, and institutions. It is important to realize that a person does not 
age in place without context. To understand how AEs occur and what factors contributed, it 
is essential to use a systems approach and create an understanding of the societal system 
surrounding a community dwelling person and how factors within each component of the 
system affect the other components. The sharp-end factors of an AE describe active failures 
related to the individuals directly involved in the incident. Blunt-end factors of an AE 
describe latent system-wide factors, removed from the direct control of the individuals 
immediately involved in the incident. The actions of an individual (sharp-end factors) are the 
result of multiple factors within each component of the system (blunt-end factors) that have 
intertwined to create a situation that may or may not result in harm.  Though unsafe actions 
can be seen as a result of human error (Miyagi, 2005), human error needs to be treated as a 
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consequence of system vulnerabilities and not the cause (Henriksen, Dayton, Keyes, 
Carayon, & Hughes, 2008).   
If an investigation of an event is conducted and only the immediate sharp-end factors 
are identified, the latent underlying systemic causes will be missed and ignored.  In ignoring 
the underlying causes, the chance to ameliorate the situation from reoccurring in the future is 
lost, and the latent danger remains (Miyagi, 2005; Reason, 1990; Woods & Cook, 1999).  
Focusing on improving safety culture does not deal with poor design of the system. This may 
lead to downplaying the importance of designing a system that makes it easy to do the right 
thing and harder to do the wrong thing, putting the responsibility for error avoidance back 
onto individuals operating within the system (Rollenhagen, 2010). Individuals do play a role, 
but individuals are living and functioning within a larger system that calls for them to act in 
one way or another.    
Insight is needed to uncover and understand the options an individual had when 
performing an unsafe act that led to an AE. Humans will make errors (Ayeko, 2002; IOM, 
1999), but it is possible to minimize the prevalence and consequences of those incidents, with 
an understanding of the unsafe conditions that combined with unsafe acts at the time of the 
event (Ayeko, 2002; IOM, 1999; Leape, 2004; Zecevic, Salmoni, Lewko, & Vandervoort, 
2007). Recognizing and understanding how the system and its policies combine with the 
actions of the multiple players who operate within it can have a positive influence on the 
safety of older adults requiring support  (Henriksen et al., 2008). To gain this recognition and 
understanding, use of an investigation method is needed that identifies and examines how 
multiple contributing factors within various levels of the system combine to result in an AE.    
1.3 Systemic Investigation Method 
A systemic investigation method is required to gain that deeper understanding of how to 
optimize safety for those aging in place. The Systemic Falls Investigation Method (SFIM) is 
one such tool. The SFIM is a six step method designed specifically to examine the factors 
that contribute to falls in seniors (Zecevic et al., 2007; Zecevic, Salmoni, Lewko, 
Vandervoort, & Speechley, 2009). It is based on the Integrated Safety Investigation 
Methodology (ISIM) used by the Canadian Transportation Safety Board to investigate 
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accidents in aviation. Detailed description of SFIM method is available elsewhere (Zecevic et 
al. 2007) and a summary is provided in the Methods section of this thesis. Only a brief 
description of its six steps is presented here.  
 Step one of SFIM involves collecting data using FSHEL tool based on five 
categories: the individual who fell, the software (e.g., policies and procedures), the hardware 
(e.g., equipment), the liveware (e.g., care providers, caregivers, social networks), and the 
environment (e.g., natural and physical). Step two is to develop a sequence of events and to 
identify the safety significant events. Step three consists of examining the safety significant 
events and connecting unsafe conditions with unsafe acts or unsafe decisions. The fourth step 
is to situate the identified contributing factors within one of four levels of the Swiss Cheese 
Model of Accident Causation: unsafe acts and decisions, preconditions, supervision and 
organizational issues. In step five the investigator summarizes all contributing factors to 
identify the safety deficiencies. The final step, six, is to assign priorities and develop a safety 
action. The design of the SFIM allows for a comprehensive investigation, examining system 
and human factors that contribute to an incident. The tool has been used to investigate falls in 
community (Zecevic et al., 2009), acute care and rehabilitation hospitals, assistive living and 
long term care facilities (Madady, Zecevic, Salmoni & Young, 2013; Zecevic et al., 2010; 
Zecevic, Li, Davy, Halligan, & Kothari, 2010). Although it was designed with falls in mind, 
the SFIM has the potential to investigate any type of AE in health care.  
1.4 Summary 
Older adults will require more health care and more support to safely stay in their own homes 
and age in place. With the baby boomer generation beginning to turn 65 years of age, the 
numbers of people requiring care in the home will increase. An intricate system, with 
multiple players, surrounds the care-dependent older adult and their caregivers. When these 
interlinked systemic components interact well, AEs are minimized. When this complex 
system does not interact well, unnecessary harm can result. Falls as AEs can result in 
decreased quality of life and injuries that create additional costs to the healthcare system; 
they are caused by variety of factors and increase in prevalence with advanced age. 
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Understanding the factors that contribute to falls will help with targeting appropriate 
interventions, to keep the home and community safe for older adults and their caregivers.  
1.5 Purpose 
The purpose of this study was to identify the factors that contributed to AEs, falls in 
particular, in care-dependent community-dwelling older adults and their caregivers. Specific 
objectives were to: 
• Conduct case studies using the SFIM to identify specific safety deficiencies at the 
four levels of Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation that contributed to the fall 
events.  
• Provide evidence on how the system-wide latent factors combine with the actions of 
people at the sharp end to cause AEs in care-dependent community dwelling older 
adults and their caregivers.  
• Identify the themes from patterns and similarities across multiple case studies. 
• Discuss the implications of safety breakdowns and direction for their improvements. 
1.6 Positioning the Researcher 
This study focus is of personal interest. I have been employed as an occupational therapist 
and worked as a provider in the formal homecare sector for over 15 years, assisting 
individuals with problem solving to find solutions that allow safe continued occupational 
participation within the home environment. As eligibility for government funded service 
changed, I saw individuals and families who were struggling when their PSW support hours 
were decreased or when specific services were declined. At the same time the clients on my 
caseload were getting older, frailer, and more acute, and I became interested in the ways 
society could best support older adults to safely age in place. By studying the factors that 
contribute to AEs, I hoped to learn how systemic factors connected with individual factors to 
restrict safe occupational performance and result in an AE. Through this study I hope to 
enlighten others about the roles we all play in keeping older adults safe and how choices at 
one societal level have consequences on other levels.  
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Chapter 2  
2 Methods 
2.1 Philosophical Anchor 
My research position is that of interpretivism. I agree with Finlay (2006) that perceptions and 
past experiences affected how the data collected was interpreted. I have subtle realism 
ontology. As a subtle realist, I believe that a reality does exist, but I am aware that this reality 
can be affected by subjectivity of the researcher and the participants. I acknowledge that a 
perfect representation of reality is hard to obtain (Finlay, 2006; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). As 
such, in order to represent reality as closely as possible in my interpretations of the data, I, as 
the researcher, looked for external verification from the participants, research literature, and 
researcher collaborators when interpreting data to ensure the results were trustworthy and 
authentic. 
2.2 Methodology 
To ameliorate AEs and improve safety of older adults, it is important to understand how 
various factors at multiple levels of the system linked together. Reason (1990) discussed that 
a case study methodology can provide valuable information about causal factors and their 
interactions. A collective case study research approach was selected for this project because 
case study methodology allows for an in depth analysis of complex real-life situations 
(Creswell, 2013; French, Reynolds, & Swain, 2001; Stake, 2005). “The real value of case 
study lies in the particularity of individual experience that may provide useful examples for 
larger numbers of people.” (Salminen, Harra, & Lautamo, 2006, p. 7). When using a case 
study design, the researcher completes an intensive investigation of a situation and examines 
the various factors that brought about the specific outcome. In this study, the outcome is the 
fall. This comprehensive investigation provides the basis for in-depth detailed documentation 
of the case, allowing for “naturalistic generalization”. Naturalistic generalization refers to 
generalization for others who are able to recognize their own experiences in the case (Stake, 
2005). A case study can also “be a disciplined force in setting public policy and reflecting on 
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human experience. Vicarious experience is an important basis for refining action options and 
expectations.” (Stake, 2005, p. 460). It is hoped that the results of this research will influence 
public policies and allow others to reflect on the complexities that contribute to the unsafe 
situations surrounding older adults. It is important to note that case study research is different 
from case examples or case reports, which are primarily used for professional education 
(Salminen et al., 2006). Case study research is intensive and time consuming. Data are 
collected from multiple sources and in multiple ways to ensure that the complexities of the 
case are captured. 
The methods and procedures utilized here were consistent with qualitative methodology 
and case study research. The researcher independently completed all investigations in the 
field, utilized multiple data sources, and sought external verification throughout the study. In 
an attempt to ensure trustworthiness, during the course of the study the author completed 
reflective journaling and conducted reflective discussions with the supervisor and members 
of advisory committee. Subjective reflection, as described by Finlay (2002), throughout the 
research process allowed for an increased understanding of how the information gathered 
was interpreted based on the personal reactions of the researcher.  
2.3 Procedure 
2.3.1 Setting and Recruitment 
The focus of the study was on community dwelling seniors aging in place, and therefore the 
study was completed in a community setting. In January 2011 the researcher approached the 
East Elgin Family Health Team (EEFHT) to collaborate on this research project. The EEFHT 
readily agreed to participate and assist with participant recruitment. One family physician 
and one nurse practitioner from this team were the main contacts. The EEFHT is located in 
eastern Elgin County and serves the town of Aylmer and townships of Bayham and 
Malahide, with approximately 25,000 mostly rural residents. The EEFHT is a primary health 
care team of five family physicians, three nurse practitioners, and one social worker. The 
team has been serving the community since 2005. Partnering with EEFHT allowed for 
recruitment of older adults who were Homecare recipients as well as older adults who were 
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not receiving their care from Homecare. Ethics approval was received from the University of 
Western Ontario (Appendix C).  
2.3.2 Participants 
2.3.2.1 Primary Participants 
The primary participants were fallers who were recruited directly by the EEFHT. Purposeful 
sampling was used, choosing cases that offered the greatest opportunity for learning. 
Investigating falls in older adults who received care or provided care allowed for the 
examination of the more vulnerable individuals, with more complex situations contributing to 
the AE. The inclusion criteria were: an individual over the age of 65 years, who had 
experienced a fall in the past 30 days. The participants were selected if they required 
assistance to remain living in the community or were the provider of such assistance (e.g., 
caregiver). 
Individuals were excluded if they did not speak English or were not willing to sign 
the written consent form. Participants also could not be the researcher’s current clients for 
occupational therapy services. For participants with cognitive impairments ascertained by a 
MMSE score lower than 21, consent was sought from the legally authorized substitute 
decision maker.  
2.3.2.2 Secondary Participants 
A second group of participants were identified during the case investigations and were 
recruited by the researcher. These participants were individuals who were able to provide 
relevant information about the occurrence of the fall or the factors that contributed to the 
event. Data collection from multiple sources allowed for triangulation of data. Secondary 
participants included witnesses and others with information about the event, the primary 
participant, the environment, or the organizational factors. The secondary participants 
included other family members and formal caregivers, doctors, nurses, therapists, 
Community Care Access Centres (CCAC) case managers, and friends, as well as others with 
specialized knowledge about contributing factors and circumstances related to the 
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contributing factors.  Only secondary participants who gave informed consent for the 
researcher to use their comments were included in the study. Some secondary participants 
were identified by the primary participants; other potential information sources were 
identified in discussion with the tertiary workgroup participants. 
2.3.2.3 Tertiary Workgroup Participants 
As case studies were developed, they were reviewed and discussed with up to four members 
of a SFIM workgroup as well. All members of the workgroup completed a two day training 
session on SFIM and conducted investigations in other research projects. In addition to the 
researcher, the workgroup members were: the SFIM creator, who had six years of experience 
with SFIM investigations; an experienced physical therapist and a doctoral candidate in the 
health and rehabilitation program; a second year masters student working on a project related 
to falls occurring in stroke survivors; and a second year kinesiology masters student 
interested in patient safety and diverse systemic investigation methods. 
2.3.3 Data Collection  
The Systemic Falls Investigation Method (SFIM) was chosen as the data collection tool. 
Previous studies have demonstrated that it is an effective method for identification of system-
wide contributing factors to falls that occur in a community setting with an older adult 
population. In October of 2011, the researcher attended a two day workshop on how to utilize 
the SFIM and use the web-based SFIM Database.  The workshop was taught by Dr. A. 
Zecevic, the original author of the SFIM (Zecevic et al., 2007).  
In January 2012, the researcher attended a staff meeting at the EEFHT and explained 
to the staff members the purpose of the study, study protocol, and participant recruitment 
process. Identification of eligible participants and a suggested script for participant 
recruitment was shared with staff (Appendix D). Envelopes containing a letter of information 
and consent form (Appendix E) were provided to staff to deliver to the potential participants.   
From late January 2012 to early June 2012 EEFHT physicians and nurse practitioners 
approached eligible individuals with an invitation to participate in the study. When an 
individual agreed, the recruiter ensured that the potential participant obtained a letter of 
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information and completed the contact information form (Appendix F). The EEFHT then 
contacted the researcher by telephone to pick up the contact information form. Once the 
researcher had the contact information, the researcher telephoned the primary participant to 
arrange for an initial interview. All interviews were completed within two days of receiving 
the contact information. 
The first interview involved the primary participant and his/her caregiver. In the 
situation where the primary participant was a caregiver, the care receiver was also involved 
in the interview. The interview started with reviewing the letter of information, answering 
any questions and obtaining consent. Once consent was received, the Mini Mental State 
Exam (MMSE) (Appendix G) was completed (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975). The 
MMSE is a cognitive screening tool that can check for potential cognitive impairment and is 
used in the context of SFIM data collection to establish credibility of facts provided by the 
faller.  One participant did not complete the MMSE. This participant went to hospital after 
the fall where she experienced confusion that was not evident prior to the fall. She described 
minor difficulties with learning new tasks and had her daughter provide most of the 
information for the investigation. For the purpose of this study, her cognitive status was 
labeled as mild cognitive impairment. When the MMSE score was less than 21, all data 
obtained from the faller had to be triangulated and confirmed with at least two alternate 
information sources. Only one participant had a score lower than 21 and the above mentioned 
protocol was followed. After the cognitive screen, the SFIM investigation process 
commenced. 
2.3.3.1 Systemic Falls Investigation Method Process  
A brief overview of the SFIM was given in chapter one. This section provides further details 
and examples to allow for study replication. Though separated into six steps, the first two 
components were a cyclical process, with continual researcher reflexivity and member 
checking with participants to ensure triangulation and credibility of the data collected, and to 
produce a summary of the event. 
Step one: Completion of a semi-structured interview at the home of the faller 
(interview template, Appendix H). An interview was conducted with the faller and his/her 
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caregiver, or care recipient if the event occurred with the caregiver. The objective of the 
interview was to collect data using the F-SHEL framework: 
• F—facts about the faller; includes their physical, physiological, psychological 
and psychosocial characteristics  
• S—software; includes training, policies and procedures, manuals, and/or 
checklists that were in place, either for the care procedures of the faller or for 
any equipment that was in use 
• H—hardware; includes equipment used, mobility aids, transfer aids, bath aids, 
layout of items, display screens, footwear used by individuals involved at the 
time of the fall 
• E—faller’s environment; includes internal conditions such as lighting, 
temperature, noise, floor conditions and external environment such as 
weather, community conditions/particularities 
• L—liveware surrounding the faller; includes the other people involved, 
witnesses, healthcare providers and agencies, other family members, peoples’ 
attitudes, social networks, communication  
All interviews were audio recorded. In addition photos were taken of the home environment, 
aids used at the time, and location of the fall. Recreation of the event occurred in this initial 
interview. The initial interviews with the primary participants provided information for steps 
two and three and on average took 45 minutes to an hour and a half to complete.  
Step one also involved a review of medications, review of health records, and on-line 
searches for additional details such as building codes. Any secondary participants identified 
at the time of the initial interview were contacted, had the nature of the study explained to 
them, verbally or by email, and asked if they wished to participate in the study. When 
secondary participants agreed to an interview, he/she was presented with a letter of 
information and asked to sign a consent form (Appendix I). Interviews with secondary 
participants took on average 10 minutes to an hour (interview template, appendix J). Each of 
these processes took half an hour to an hour to complete. 
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Step two: Develop the sequence of events that led up to the event. This step was initiated 
by the researcher after the initial interview and involved developing a chronological 
hypothesis of the sequence of events that led to the fall. The sequence of events was then 
revised and confirmed through additional data collection and the events that were safety-
significant were identified.  Safety significant events (SSEs) were acts and decisions that 
directly contributed to the AE.   An SSE was determined by answering the following 
questions about each event in the sequence: 
• Was this task undesirable? 
• Was this task non-standard? 
• Was this task linked or potentially linked to another undesirable event? 
• Was this task one of alternative actions or options available? 
If the answer was ‘yes’ to any of the questions, the act was classified as an SSE.  Each SSE 
was then examined more closely by asking further questions regarding the “why”. For 
example: Why was this task undesirable? Why was this task completed in a non-standard 
format? Why did the individual choose to complete this action over another one? The “why” 
questions uncovered further need for data collection and led to interviews with additionally 
identified secondary participants, further observations, or further review of additional data 
sources, such as written materials on policies or medical records. 
At this point the sequence of events and identified SSEs were reviewed with 
workgroup participants to discuss potential gaps in the sequence of events and to determine 
what further data were required to answer the “why” questions.  Follow up interviews were 
completed at the participant’s home, place of work, over the telephone, or by email, 
depending on the information required and the preference of the participant. All of the 
interviews and follow-ups occurred within four weeks from the first contact with the faller.   
Once the sequence of events was clearly articulated and workgroup members were 
satisfied with the depth and thoroughness of investigation, a narrative summary of the fall 
was written and the de-identified data were entered into the web-based SFIM database. Data 
stored in SFIM database were stripped of all personal identifiers and assigned a unique code. 
The SSEs and their contributing factors were further analyzed for step four of the SFIM.  
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Step three: Generic Error Modeling System (GEMS). In the SFIM, unsafe acts and 
decisions are analyzed further using the Generic Error Modeling System (GEMS) (Reason, 
1987). This system of modeling human error is used to determine: 
• the mindset of the person at the time of the event  
• if the error was skill-based, rule-based, or knowledge-based  
• which failure mode corresponded to a skill-based slip or lapse: inattention or over-
attention 
• which failure mode corresponded to a rule-based or knowledge-based mistake: 
misapplication of good rules, application of a bad rule, biases, or heuristics.  
• which failure modes corresponded to a knowledge-based adaption: biases or 
heuristics.   
More detailed description of GEMS analysis is available in Reason (1987). This analysis was 
completed by A. Zecevic for all case studies and results were not included in this thesis. 
  
Step four: Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation analysis. The fourth step of 
the SFIM maps contributing factors identified in step two to the Swiss Cheese Model of 
Accident Causation developed by Reason (1990) and adapted for the SFIM by Zecevic et al. 
(2007). The four levels of this model include: unsafe acts and decisions, preconditions, 
supervision factors, and organizational factors. Each “slice of the cheese” represents a layer 
of defense where an AE could be prevented. Holes in the defense layers can be both active 
failures and latent conditions. For an AE to occur, “holes” on all four levels of defenses must 
line up to allow an accident arrow to connect a vulnerable person and a hazard (Figure 1). 
During this analysis the researcher identified the level of Swiss Cheese Model of Accident 
Causation for each act, decision, and contributing factor. These data were entered into the 
SFIM database to create a summary table of all contributing factors separated into the four 
levels.  
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Figure 1 SFIM's use of the Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation © Aleksandra A 
Zecevic 2007.  
Step five: Identifying Safety Deficiencies and Risk Assessment. At this time in the 
within-case study analysis, the unsafe conditions and underlying factors were reviewed to 
determine which of the factors had the most potential for adverse consequences, how 
adequate the existing defenses were, and how potentially ameliorable each factor was. When 
SFIM is used in healthcare organizations, the investigator works together with safety teams 
to assign risk priorities and examine adequacy of current defenses. Considering that this was 
a community based study, the level of risk was estimated as high for all safety significant 
events and all safety deficiencies were given a high priority.   
 Step six: Development of safety actions. The final step in the SFIM investigative 
process is to develop safety actions.  The job of the SFIM investigator is to find what went 
wrong and inform those in a position to implement changes. Those directly related to an 
identified safety deficiencies are best able to determine how to correct the situation to close 
the holes and improve defenses. This improves the safety not only for individuals involved in 
the investigated AE, but for many other community dwelling older adults aging in place.  
Knowledge translation activities have already involved sharing the SFIM reports with the 
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county housing authority and the family health team. Plans are underway to share the results 
with the Public Health Unit and the South West LHIN. 
2.3.4 Data Analysis 
Data analysis occurred in two phases. The first was within-case analysis that occurred during 
the SFIM investigation process, as described above. The data collected from interviews and 
other sources were reviewed and discussed with at least one and up to four other researchers. 
This allowed for multiple perspectives, generation of hypotheses and expansion of the 
investigation’s scope to additional contributing factors.  This process facilitated credibility 
and improved accuracy of the collected information (Ballinger, 2006; Creswell, 2013; 
Salminen et al., 2006). Each contributing factor was further analyzed for placement within 
the system-wide framework provided by the Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation.  
Upon completion of the investigation, the secondary reviewer (AZ) thoroughly reviewed the 
final report and sequence of events of each case study for accuracy, consistency, coherence, 
and quality.  
The second phase of data analysis focused on similarities, patterns, and repetitions 
between case studies and lead to identification of reoccurring themes. Eight summary tables, 
one for each case, of contributing factors were analyzed using content analysis. This process 
involved three researchers, and two cycles of analysis. Peer review, combined with 
prolonged engagement with the data, was employed to increase the credibility of findings 
(Ballinger, 2006; Creswell, 2013). The first stage of this analysis involved line by line coding 
of the Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation tables, independently completed by three 
researchers. The author then amalgamated the three code lists and met with the other two 
researchers to discuss the final code list, establish  consensus of all coders, and ensure that 
the list was exhaustive and that each code was clearly defined and bounded (French et al., 
2001). Once the amalgamated coding list was completed, two researchers (the author and 
supervisor AZ) independently re-coded all the contributing factors. Some minor 
discrepancies were noted and, to create definitive boundaries, the code list was slightly 
adjusted and definitions clarified to ensure consensus for a final code list. Supported by the 
prolonged engagement with the data and convergence of the codes, the author identified four 
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distinct emergent themes of patterns and reoccurrences across multiple cases. Two other 
researchers were involved with the author in discussion and consensus building around the 
emergent themes. 
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Chapter 3  
3 Results 
The results section begins with an overview of characteristics of the primary and secondary 
participants, moving to a description of the eight investigated falls. Narrative summaries and 
case study conclusions for each case study follow. Next, an overview of the contributing 
factors is presented followed by presentation of emerging themes that resulted from content 
analysis. 
3.1 Primary Participants’ Characteristics 
In total, eight individuals were recruited, but one person was immediately excluded 
from the study because she was not receiving daily assistance from a caregiver nor was she 
providing daily assistance to another person. The remaining seven individuals participated. 
All participants experienced a fall. One participant experienced two falls, and both were 
investigated as separate case studies, resulting in the total of eight case studies presented 
here.   
Participants ranged in age from 83 to 90 years, with an average age of 86 years. Table 
1 describes characteristics of primary study participants. Each primary participant has been 
given a pseudo name. Overall, all but one was female; one person had a moderate cognitive 
impairment; an average of seven medications was prescribed for each participant (range 3-
11); the majority of individuals were not using a mobility aid; and only one participant was a 
caregiver.  All were recipients of CCAC Homecare services in the past, but only one was 
receiving CCAC Homecare at the time of the fall. After their falls, three participants began 
receiving Homecare services. Two others received medical treatment for their falls but were 
not admitted to Homecare afterwards, and one person moved to LTC. 
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Table 1 Primary Participant Demographics for Falls Investigated With the SFIM 
Name Sex Age Marital 
status 
Cognitive 
status 
MMSE 
score/30 
No. of 
meds 
Equipment used at 
time of fall 
(usual mobility 
aid) 
Formal homecare 
receiver Informal care 
provided Prior to 
fall 
At Time 
of fall 
Post 
fall 
Mr. 
Dee  
M 83 Married Normal 25 3 None 
(walker and cane ) 
yes yes yes By spouse 
Mrs. 
Kay 
F 86 Widowed Mild 
impairment 
N/A 
 
7 None 
(rollator walker) 
yes no yes By daughter 
Mrs. 
Bridge 
F 90 Widowed Moderate 
impairment 
14 4 None yes no no By nephew and 
friends 
Mrs. 
Broom 
F 85 Married Normal 
 
30 
 
6 None yes no yes To spouse 
Mrs. 
Peters 
F 88 Widowed Normal 
 
26 6 Bar height stool 
(cane) 
yes no no By daughter 
Mrs. 
Rose 
F 88 Widowed Mild 
Impairment 
23 11 Straight back chair 
(rollator walker) 
yes no no By son and two 
daughters 
Mrs. 
Bee 
F 84 Married Normal 26 11 Transport 
wheelchair 
yes no yes By and for 
spouse 
(interdependent) 
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3.2 Secondary Participants’ Characteristics 
The secondary participants included family members, friends, and formal caregivers 
such as doctors, nurses, therapists, and CCAC case managers. Representatives of agencies 
that had specialized knowledge and expertise about contributing factors, such as Alzheimer 
Society, National Association for Home Builders, and public health nurse, were also 
involved.  They were not familiar with the case study occurrence but were aware of policies 
and standard practices, such as recommendations for window blinds installation. Table 2 
provides a summary of secondary participants for each case study and describes additional 
non-human data sources that were consulted for completion of the investigations.  
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Table 2 Summary of Secondary Participants and Description of Additional Data 
Sources for Eight Case Studies 
Investigation  Secondary participants Additional data sources 
Mr. Dee 
ID*14801 
Wife, nurse practitioner, family 
physician,  physiotherapist 
Canoe website** for medication review  
 
Mrs. Kay1 
ID 15522 
Daughter, nurse practitioner, 
pharmacist and pharmacist technician, 
certified window blind installer with15 
years of experience, CCAC hospital 
case manager (CM) 
Primary care health record, two unrelated 
pharmacy technicians from one large and one 
small pharmacy 
Mrs. Kay2 
ID 15523 
Daughter, nurse practitioner, PSW 
supervisor for this supportive housing 
building, occupational therapist, CCAC 
hospital CM 
Primary care health record; aging-in-place 
design literature from Canada Mortgage and 
Housing Corporation, National Association 
for Home Builders  and the Centre for 
Universal Design 
Mrs. Bridge 
ID 15524 
Nephew, family physician, friend, 
CCAC community CM, occupational 
therapist from 2010, Alzheimer Society 
counselor  
Primary care health record 
Mrs. Broom 
ID 15525 
Spouse, daughter, occupational 
therapist, public health nurse 
overseeing falls prevention 
Local hardware store survey of broom handle 
styles on the brooms available for sale, online 
broom handle style search 
Mrs. Peters 
ID 16036 
Daughter, certified age-in-place 
specialist, director of planning and 
municipal services, social housing 
administrator, building contractor/ 
landlord, community nurse 
Aging-in-place design literature from Canada 
Mortgage and Housing Corporation, National 
Association for Home Builders  and the 
Centre for Universal Design 
Mrs. Rose 
ID 16259 
Daughter, son-in-law, PSW, family 
physician, occupational therapist, 
physical therapist 
Therapy provider reports, primary care health 
records, CCAC referral for therapy 
Mrs. Bee 
ID 16383 
Husband, nurse practitioner,  secretary 
from ophthalmologist office 
Primary care health records, sales 
representative from local vendor for 
healthcare equipment,  transport wheelchair 
manufacturer literature from AMG and 
Invacare 
Notes: 1 & 2 indicate first and second adverse event for the same faller; * ID number provides a reference 
for the full case study report in Appendix K-R; ** Canoe website for medication review 
http://chealth.canoe.ca/drug_info.asp?relation_id=1196 was used for all investigations; CCAC is 
Community Care Access Centre; CM is case manager; AMG is a healthcare equipment manufacturer. 
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3.3 Characteristics of Falls Investigated 
As previously indicated, all AEs investigated were falls; however one investigation also 
uncovered a medication error. The error came to light after the fall, and although examined 
within the context of the SFIM parameters, it was not the major trigger for the investigated 
fall. Half of the falls occurred in the morning. All happened indoors: four in the kitchen, two 
in the bedroom, one in the living room, and one at the front entrance of the home. Six of the 
falls resulted in a visit to the hospital, with two fallers being admitted for hospital stay. Two 
falls did not require medical attention and were divulged during a routine primary care visit. 
Table 3 describes in more detail all the investigated falls. 
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Table 3 Characteristics of Eight Investigated Falls and Their Consequences 
Note: 1 & 2 indicate first and second adverse event for the same faller 
 
Investigation Age Fall location Time 
of fall  
Medical 
attention 
received 
Injury sustained Living situation post fall 
Mr. Dee 
ID 14801 
83 Kitchen 14:00 Routine 
primary care 
visit 
None Remained at 
home 
Mrs. Kay1  
ID 15522 
86 Living room 07:45 ER visit Concussion After ER visit 
returned home 
for one week 
Mrs. Kay2 
ID 15523 
86 Bedroom 01:00 Admitted  to 
hospital  
Back and right 
leg pain;  unable 
to stand  
Over 2 months 
in the hospital; 
considering a 
return home 
with CCAC 
support 
Mrs. Bridge 
ID 15524 
90 Front entrance 10:00 Admit to 
hospital 
Hip fracture Admit to LTC 
Mrs. Broom  
ID 15525 
85 Kitchen 09:00 ER visit Humerus 
fracture 
Remained at 
home 
Mrs. Peters  
ID 16036 
88 Kitchen 18:45 ER visit Staples for head 
wound 
Remained at 
home 
Mrs. Rose  
ID 16259 
88 Bedroom 14:30 Routine 
primary care 
visit 
Bruising Remained at 
home 
Mrs. Bee  
ID 16383 
84 Kitchen 22:30 ER visit Rib fracture Remained at 
home 
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3.4 Narrative Case Summaries 
In-depth, detailed documentation of the case is required for naturalistic generalization from 
the cases (Stake, 2005) and to allow readers to see the particularities of the cases and use 
these details as examples for forming solutions (Salminen et al., 2006). Due to length, full 
case reports generated by SFIM database are presented the appendices (Appendices K-R). 
The within case analysis summary of each case, describing the contributing factors and how 
they interconnected to result in the fall, are presented here.  
3.4.1 Mr. Dee (ID 14801) 
Mr. Dee, an 83 year old gentleman who lived with his wife in a small, compact home. He fell 
backward in his kitchen on December 23, 2011. In 2009, he had slipped on snow and 
fractured his left hip. He had a history of “blurred vision” when moving his head up and 
down, which he never mentioned to his wife.  
On the day of the fall, while his wife was in the next room setting up Christmas 
decorations, he walked through the kitchen, without his cane or walker, to sit down at the 
table. Wanting to help his wife out, he stopped at the counter to stir up bread cubes that were 
drying for Christmas turkey stuffing. While completing the task, he moved his head up and 
down, and his vision became blurry.  He stumbled backwards and landed on the ground. He 
was not injured. His wife heard the noise and came into the kitchen to assist him to stand up. 
Using the Systemic Falls Investigative Method (SFIM), multiple contributing factors 
were identified, including deficiencies within all four levels of the Swiss Cheese Model of 
Accident Causation. 
• Mr. Dee had a number of health related preconditions which contributed to the fall. 
They were a past left hip fracture, poor proprioception in his left foot, poor balance, 
as well as blurred vision associated with head movements and when standing up too 
fast.   
• Mr. Dee‘s actions and decisions also contributed to this fall. He ambulated within the 
small compact house without his rollator walker due to the constrained small spaces, 
he did not mention his episodes of blurred vision to his new doctor or his wife 
because the episodes were long standing, and he felt his compensation method of not 
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standing up too fast was sufficient. Also, he was multitasking, when he moved his 
head up and down while standing and stirring bread crumbs with both of his hands 
occupied. 
• The compact, small home was unsuitable for an individual who requires constant use 
of a rollator walker. Mr. Dee did not use his walker inside the home, which increased 
his risk for falls. 
• The wife was occupied in the living room and unable to redirect Mr. Dee from 
multitasking at the kitchen counter. 
• Medical files were not freely shared when a patient transfers from one family 
physician to another. It is a common practice of doctors to charge patients to have 
their medical files transferred.  This fee covers the administrative, copying and 
courier cost incurred by the physician and are not billable to the Ontario Ministry of 
Health. Mr. Dee declined to pay the $70 transfer cost, and the new physician did not 
insist on having Mr. Dee’s old medical record. To mitigate this situation, Mr. Dee’s 
wife kept a record of his medical appointments, test results, diagnoses and 
medications.   
• The wife’s medical history of Mr. Dee was incomplete. Mrs. Dee was unaware that 
her thorough note keeping of medical tests and results was incomplete. The notes had 
nothing about episodes of faller’s blurry vision.  
• The new physician accepted the medical history kept by Mrs. Dee in lieu of a medical 
chart from the past physician. This information was assumed to be accurate in the 
absence of a full medical record. Ultimately, the new physician was unaware of the 
need to investigate physiological issues contributing to Mr. Dee’s blurred vision.  
Unsafe actions and decisions of Mr. Dee, his wife, and doctor combined with contributing 
latent conditions at all four levels of the Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation and 
resulted in this adverse event. 
3.4.2 Mrs. Kay (ID 15522, 15523)  
The name Mrs. Kay was used for both investigations of the same participant. The name Mrs. 
Kay1 refers to findings from investigation of her first fall (ID15522), and the name Mrs. Kay2 
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refers to findings from investigation of her second fall (ID 15523). To avoid repetition of 
generic person-related information two investigations are combined.  
Mrs. Kay, an 85 year old woman living alone in a rental apartment, fell backward at 
about 7:55 am on March 25, 2012. The building in which she lived was an apartment 
building designated as a supportive housing building by the Local Health Integration 
Network (LHIN). Mrs. Kay did not have a previous history of falls but did have a fear of 
falling.  A widow, she relied on her family, particularly one daughter who lived close, to 
assist her with tasks around the apartment and to attend appointments with her. Mrs. Kay1’s 
first fall occurred when she leaned to the right side to reach behind a lamp and access a cord 
that opens the vertical blinds.  This was a task she usually completed from a sitting and not a 
standing position. When she straightened again, she stumbled backwards and fell, hitting her 
head on the coffee table. Mrs. Kay1 called her grandson to help and was brought to ER and 
diagnosed with a mild concussion as a result of this fall. 
 Mrs. Kay2’s second fall was just after midnight on April 1, 2012. On the night of this 
fall, Mrs. Kay2 was hot, so she got out of bed to open the bedroom window and cool the 
bedroom. She reached to the right and up over shoulder level, lost her balance, and fell to the 
left side. She was unable to get up on her own and she pressed Lifeline. Her daughter and 
son-in-law came to assist. Mrs. Kay2 had difficulty standing and was unable to walk even 
with help. Daughter called an ambulance and Mrs. Kay2 was admitted to the hospital for 
further investigation.  
Using the Systemic Falls Investigative Method (SFIM), multiple contributing factors 
were identified for both falls, and they included safety deficiencies within all four levels of 
the Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation. 
• Mrs. Kay had a number of health related preconditions that contributed to the falls. 
She was deconditioned; she had decreased strength in her right shoulder; and her right 
knee had buckled in the past and was unreliable for weight bearing. She had poor 
balance and a fear of falling. She showed minor cognitive changes affecting her 
ability to learn new tasks and was apprehensive in new situations. She was also taking 
an extra dose of Avapro®, a blood pressure medication (150 mg dose in addition to 
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the original 300mg dose). On March 27th the mistake was discovered by her nurse 
practitioner and the dose was reduced to 300mg. 
• Mrs. Kay‘s actions and decisions also contributed to her falls: (1) Due to sentimental 
attachment, Mrs. Kay1 and her family decided to retain extra living room furniture 
when she downsized from house to an apartment; (2) Due to apprehensiveness in a 
new environment, she decreased her activity level after moving to an apartment in 
June 2011; (3) After a one week stay in the hospital, precipitated by a bladder 
infection, she declined Community Care Access Centre (CCAC) services offered to 
her at time of discharge in September 2011; (4) On the day of the first fall, she 
awkwardly leaned over to the right and over-reached behind a lamp to pull open 
vertical blinds; (5) . On the day of the second fall, she over-reached up and to the side 
with both arms to pull a window open.  
• The physical environments also contributed to her falls: (1) The vertical blinds, which 
were left in place by the previous tenants, had the pull cord positioned at the end 
away from where the door opened, behind a lamp; (2) The bedroom windows height 
was 48 inches from floor to the window sill and another 12 inches to the latch and 
pull handle. The latches required both hands to pull the window open, one to hold the 
latch down and the other to pull on the window; (3) The apartments did not have 
individual thermostats, requiring Mrs. Kay2 to regulate room temperature by opening 
and closing the windows.  Many other seniors in the same building relied on the 
assistance of personal support workers (PSWs) or family caregivers to open and close 
the bedroom windows. 
• The daughter, her primary care giver, had less time to effectively reassure Mrs. Kay 
in her new residence in the summer of 2011. The daughter’s husband was ill and her 
own daughter was getting married. Other family members lived out of town or 
worked full-time, limiting opportunities for visiting and encouraging Mrs. Kay to 
increase her activity level. Also the summer was very hot, limiting outdoor mobility. 
Mrs. Kay was reluctant to venture out on her own and became deconditioned.  
• The CCAC was in contact with Mrs. Kay in September 2011 during a hospital 
admission.  Mrs. Kay declined CCAC services because she decided to stay with her 
daughter upon discharge, so the CCAC did not open a file after a bedside 
35 
 
 
consultation. CCAC’s standard practice is not to follow-up with an individual when 
services are declined since they are busy managing active cases. However, the CCAC 
does have a “case management only” status, which allows for follow-up of an 
individual for up-to three months when initially no services are put into place, but this 
status is rarely used.   
• CCAC lacked a policy to follow-up with patients who declined services post-hospital 
discharge to ensure the patient’s safety needs were met. Expectation of the hospital 
CCAC case manager (CM) was that the patient will recall information given at the 
time of discharge. Mrs. Kay was overwhelmed with information received close to 
discharge, and she did not recall the CCAC information when she returned home after 
her one month stay with family, when she stated she was experiencing difficulty with 
standing transfers. 
• Family addressed Mrs. Kay’s decrease in strength by purchasing a lift chair in 
October 2011. The daughter and Mrs. Kay did not consider physical therapy or 
volunteer run senior exercise group available in the neighborhood to ameliorate 
physical deterioration. The lift chair compensated for the weakness and difficulty 
with standing transfers but contributed to Mrs. Kay’s further decline of strength.  
• Family assumed they had all necessary information on vertical blinds. The vertical 
blinds’ pull cord was positioned at the side of the window blocked by a side table and 
lamp when Mrs. Kay1 moved into the apartment in June 2011. The family chose to 
keep the pull cord’s position, assuming that if the position was changed the blinds 
would gather in front of the patio door and become a hazard. The family was unaware 
of the option of changing the pull cord direction without changing position of the 
blinds. The manufacturer instructions for the vertical blinds were not available from 
the previous tenant, but, unknown to the family directions for changing the cord 
position were available online.  
• Family yielded to Mrs. Kay1’s desire to retain her possessions from her previous 
home. Extra furniture limited Mrs. Kay1’s access to the pull cord for the vertical 
blinds that was left in place from the previous tenant. 
• The pharmacy’s policy was to give only verbal instructions for a medication change. 
The pharmacy assumed the doctor had discussed and ensured Mrs. Kay1 understood 
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the medication change. Mrs. Kay1’s daughter did not recall receiving the verbal 
instructions from the pharmacist or from the prescribing doctor for Mrs. Kay1 to stop 
the one dosage of Avapro before beginning the new dose. Mrs. Kay1 was unaware she 
should stop the initial dose of Avapro and ended up taking an extra dose (300 mg plus 
150 mg) of this blood pressure medication starting on March 19, 2012.  This could 
have affected her blood pressure when she was standing and reaching.  
• The Local Health Integration Network (LHIN) gave the distinction of “supportive 
housing building” to the building where Mrs. Kay2 lived based on the large number of 
seniors who were already living there. The supportive housing program allowed for 
greater number of funded services to eligible seniors. Mrs. Kay2 specifically moved to 
this building because of the building’s supportive housing designation. However, the 
building had some features that were unsatisfactory for the needs of seniors, such as 
high windows, narrow bathroom door, baseboard heater in front of patio door, etc. 
• The CCAC intake case manager, who works in-office taking information regarding 
incoming referrals, delayed putting PSW assistance in place after Mrs. Kay2’s two fall 
incidents earlier in the week, even though the daughter had reported to the intake CM 
that her mother required assistance and was at risk for more falls. Some intake CM’s 
practice was to delay PSW initiation until the OT and the community CM completed 
assessments to confirm what level of assistance was required.  
Unsafe actions and decisions of Mrs. Kay, her family, her pharmacist, the CCAC, and the 
LHIN combined with contributing latent conditions at all four levels of the Swiss Cheese 
Model of Accident Causation and resulted in this adverse event. 
3.4.3 Mrs. Bridge (ID 15524)  
Mrs. Bridge, a 90 year old lady, lived alone in her own home. She was a very independent, 
active, “on the go” lady. She played bridge weekly with a consistent group of friends and was 
a member of a local service club. Seven weeks prior to her fall, Mrs. Bridge had her 
remaining five teeth extracted, so her dental plate no longer fit.  Her nephew visited twice a 
day to ensure she had soft meals and to see that she was well.  On March 28, 2012, at 10:00 
am, Mrs. Bridge fell inside the front door of her home and fractured her right hip. Her 
nephew found her when he went to pick her up for a dental appointment. She reported that 
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she had gone outside to check her flowers and fell when she re-entered. The inner front door 
was closed, and judging from the direction of landing, it was likely that she stumbled after 
turning to close the door. 
Using the Systemic Falls Investigative Method (SFIM), multiple contributing factors 
were identified, including deficiencies within all four levels of the Swiss Cheese Model of 
Accident Causation.  
• Mrs. Bridge had a number of health related preconditions that contributed to the fall. 
They were:  history of falls, poor balance, and decreased cognition (14/30 on the 
MMSE post fall). 
• Mrs. Bridge‘s actions and decisions also contributed: she inconsistently visited her 
doctor, frequently skipped taking prescribed medication,  declined medical advice,  
declined installation of Lifeline®, and discontinued daily CCAC support services. 
She historically had a laissez faire attitude to life, an independent (reportedly 
stubborn) personality, and persuasive verbal skills. 
• Family supervision was not available to monitor Mrs. Bridge’s actions and 
compliance with medical advice prior to 2011. She was widowed and had no 
children. She attended medical appointments alone, and there were no informal 
caregivers to monitor adherence to medical advice. When her nephew began to visit 
weekly in 2011, he provided transportation only and did not want to be “snoopy” 
regarding his aunt’s affairs. 
• Mrs. Bridge’s friends felt that they did not have the authority to intervene with her 
choices. Mrs. Bridge was able to “fool” those around her to hide her cognitive 
weaknesses. When the friends noticed an increase in Mrs. Bridge’s disheveled 
appearance and inappropriate actions, such as taking moldy cheese to a social event, 
they felt helpless. Friends were unaware that community agencies such as the 
Alzheimer Society could provide suggestions on how to support a person with any 
type of cognitive decline. 
• PSW visit times were inconsistent and did not always meet Mrs. Bridge’s needs or 
preferences. Timing of CCAC PSW visits reportedly interfered with Mrs. Bridge’s 
routine, leading to discontinuation of service. CCAC was only able to keep a file open 
to monitor a client for three months, at which time, if no services were introduced, the 
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case manager must close the file. In 2010, Mrs. Bridge gave the false impression that 
she was managing well with the supports from her friends. The CCAC file was closed 
and not reopened. When CCAC services were discontinued, the only formal way of 
monitoring her cognitive decline and high fall risk was lost. 
• Mrs. Bridge’s doctor was unaware that CCAC services were discontinued and did not 
know about any safety concerns the CCAC service personnel may have had when the 
file was closed. The CCAC does not send a discharge report to the primary care 
physician when services are discontinued. 
• The family physician lacked a method to trigger a recall visit to reassess a patient 
with consistent but slow cognitive decline or a history of falls, although such follow-
up visits are standard practice for individuals with diabetes.  
• Neither the CCAC CM nor the family physician formally questioned Mrs. Bridge’s 
capacity to make her own decisions. Their standard practice was to err on the side of 
caution when cognitive capacity was in question, to preserve an individual’s rights. A 
capable person is entitled to make choices that may not appear to be the best choice in 
the opinion of others. Mrs. Bridge’s capacity to make decisions had not been formally 
assessed by a capacity assessor. A capacity assessor can be any health care 
professional who has been trained through the Ministry of the Attorney General to 
determine whether an individual is mentally capable of certain types of decision-
making. The family doctor rarely requested that a patient have a capacity assessment 
completed. The regular practice was to wait until an individual is admitted to the 
hospital and have the hospital healthcare team deem an individual unsuitable for 
return home due to cognitive impairment.  
• There was a lack of communication between doctor, nephew, friends, and CCAC. 
This enabled Mrs. Bridge’s cognitive decline to continue unaddressed. 
Unsafe actions and decisions of Mrs. Bridge, her nephew, her friends, the CCAC, and doctor 
combined with contributing latent conditions at all four levels of the Swiss Cheese Model of 
Accident Causation and resulted in this adverse event. 
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3.4.4 Mrs. Broom (ID 15525)  
Mrs. Broom, an 85 year old lady, fell on February 24, 2012, inside the home she shared with 
her husband. She fell forward, landed on her right arm, and fractured her humerus.  Mrs. 
Broom was responsible for all the meals and household chores for herself and her husband. 
On the day of the fall, she tripped over a broom handle as it slipped along a kitchen counter 
to the floor in front of her. In the rush to get things done on the morning of the fall, she had 
intentionally left the broom leaning on the kitchen counter. Mrs. Broom was aware the broom 
position was unsafe, as the broom had slid and fallen to the floor in the past.  After the fall 
she required medical attention at the emergency department of the hospital.   
Using the Systemic Falls Investigative Method (SFIM), multiple contributing factors 
were identified, including deficiencies within all four levels of the Swiss Cheese Model of 
Accident Causation. 
• Mrs. Broom had a number of health related preconditions which contributed to the 
fall. They were: history of one previous fall, history of arthritis, right hip replacement 
in 2008, arthritis in left hip, and a decreased reaction time related to age and reduced 
activity level.   
• Mrs. Broom’s actions and decisions also contributed: rushing while multitasking and 
leaving a broom that had a history of sliding down leaned against the counter. 
• Fall prevention education programs provided by the local Health Unit were not 
reaching seniors in the community or influencing change in their unsafe behaviours. 
A formal, public fall prevention session has not been offered in this small town by the 
Public Health Unit since 2006. The Health Unit changed focus from formal 
workshops on falls prevention to printed media messages to educate seniors about fall 
prevention. Mrs. Broom had never seen these media messages, although she regularly 
reads local newspapers. 
• Fall prevention education from OT was not memorable for Mrs. Broom. She did not 
recall safety suggestions provided by OT at the time of hip surgery in 2008, or even 
after this most recent fall. Mrs. Broom has no recollection of being formally educated 
on fall prevention strategies, though the CCAC had put therapy services into place 
both times to assure safety in her home. 
40 
 
 
• Brooms similar to the one Mrs. Broom used were manufactured with handles that do 
not have a non-slip surface to prevent sliding when leaned against a counter. Most 
brooms have varnished or PVC coated handles, which are smooth, allowing the 
handle to slide when placed against a counter. There were no brooms with non-slip 
handles available for purchase in the local stores. 
• Daughter, after sitting in on therapy session, was unable to convince Mrs. Broom to 
incorporate more fall prevention strategies into her daily activities, such as wall 
mounted grab bars in the bathroom and gate in front of open stairway. Mrs. Broom 
felt that recommended changes did not apply to her and her current functional status. 
Mrs. Broom was a competent adult; her daughter was unable to enforce her 
suggestions. 
Unsafe actions and decisions of Mrs. Broom combined with contributing latent conditions at 
all four levels of the Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation and resulted in this adverse 
event. 
3.4.5 Mrs. Peters (ID 16036)  
Mrs. Peters, an 88 year old lady, fell on April 30, 2012 at 6:45 pm while reaching low into a 
deep corner cupboard for an infrequently used bowl. Mrs. Peters had made some strawberry 
sauce that evening and wanted to put it away. She needed to access a bowl stored in the back 
of a difficult to reach, lower, deep corner cupboard. She leaned over, supporting herself on a 
tall stool, and reached to the back of the cupboard for the large bowl. She placed the bowl on 
the counter, but before she was able to stand again, the stool tipped sideways, and she fell 
over backwards. Mrs. Peters moved into this newly built apartment building, dedicated for 
low-income seniors and persons with a disability, in April 2011, a year before the fall.  
Using the Systemic Falls Investigative Method (SFIM), multiple contributing factors 
were identified, including deficiencies within all four levels of the Swiss Cheese Model of 
Accident Causation. 
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• Mrs. Peters had a number of health related preconditions that contributed to the fall. 
They were: a past fall in the bathroom of her previous residence, blood pressure 
medication, and poor balance. 
• Mrs. Peters’ actions and decisions also contributed: multitasking while leaning on a 
stool and reaching forward into a deep cupboard. 
• Family assisted Mrs. Peters to store some kitchen items in a difficult to reach, low, 
deep corner cabinet when she moved into the apartment. Family was aware of the 
awkward design of this kitchen cabinet, and assisted Mrs. Peters to store less 
frequently used items there. The kitchen design was such that easily accessible 
storage space between shoulder and waist height was not available. Mrs. Peters had 
no option but to store items that required occasional access in a difficult to reach area. 
• Age-in-place design features were not implemented in the units geared to seniors in 
this newly built apartment building, although the checklists with age-in-place design 
recommendations was readily available on-line. 
• The County housing authority’s procedure for awarding a $1.7 million contract for 
construction of this senior friendly building did not include requirements for age-in-
place design features.  
• Both the contractor and the County housing authority were unfamiliar with age-in-
place design features.  
• Ontario building code also does not include age-in-place design considerations. 
Wheelchair accessibility design features and universal design guidelines are 
integrated into the Ontario building code, but specific age-in-place designs are not 
mandatory.  
Unsafe actions and decisions of Mrs. Peters, family, County housing authority and builder 
combined with contributing latent conditions at all four levels of the Swiss Cheese Model of 
Accident Causation and resulted in this adverse event.  
3.4.6 Mrs. Rose (ID 16259)  
Mrs. Rose, an 88 year old lady, fell inside her home on the afternoon of May 10, 2012 while 
reaching for a container of TUMS®. She had recently returned home from the adult day 
program, and her stomach was upset. She walked to the bedroom, where she leaned on the 
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back of a chair with her left hand as she reached forward with her right hand to a narrow 
shelving unit in the corner.  As she grasped the container of TUMS®, she straightened, lost 
her balance and fell backward to the left side, pulling the chair with her. She was able to use 
her Lifeline® service and obtain assistance from her family, who lived across the road, to get 
up from the fall. Medical attention was not required after the fall. 
• This event was investigated using the Systemic Falls Investigative Method (SFIM). 
Multiple contributing factors were identified and they included deficiencies within all 
four levels of the Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation. Mrs. Rose had a 
number of health related preconditions which contributed to the fall. They were: 
arthritis, decrease range of motion in her right shoulder, decreased endurance, poor 
balance which noticeably worsened when Mrs. Rose was fatigued, 11 prescription 
medications, re-occurring upset stomach, a previous stroke with residual left side 
weakness and decreased coordination (Dec 31, 2012), and history of frequent bladder 
infections and cellulitis. 
• The following Mrs. Rose’s actions and decisions contributed:  she did not follow up 
with home exercise routines, she stored the frequently used TUMS® in a difficult to 
reach location, she ‘fired’ her daily PSW support and declined follow up attempts by 
the occupational therapist from CCAC. 
• The initial OT services offered by the CCAC after Mrs. Rose’s stroke focused on 
equipment needs and mobility safety within the home. The OT only completed initial 
assessment and there were no follow-up visits. The location of frequently used items, 
such as her TUMS®, was not discussed. Attempts for further follow-up from this OT 
were declined by the Mrs. Rose. She was overwhelmed by the number of different 
support workers and therapists coming into her home.  
• Multiple PSWs were assigned to care for Mrs. Rose. Daily PSW visits were difficult 
to cover with a consistent time and staff member. New clients who require daily visits 
were scheduled within existing time schedules of PSWs. If additional PSWs were 
recruited to cover the ‘ideal’ morning preparation hours (7-9 am), there would be 
fewer hours of work for each PSW. The PSWs who want eight hours of pay per day 
have to work approximately 12 hours a day to offset the time lost between 
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appointments. PSW visitation hours are controlled by the agency’s schedulers who 
are not familiar with the preferences of clients receiving service. 
• PSW visit times to Mrs. Rose’s home varied each day. Mrs. Rose was asked not to 
dress until the PSW arrives to assist her with the bath. Mrs. Rose did not like waiting 
in her night gown for the PSW to arrive, which would be sometimes in late morning 
and sometimes not at all.  
• Family left TUMS® at the same location where Mrs. Rose had them prior to the 
stroke. The family was unaware of the difficulty Mrs. Rose had in accessing 
TUMS®. The family members came in twice a day, or more if needed, to assist Mrs. 
Rose with other activities such as glucose check, insulin shot, meals, and letting out 
the dog. Any difficulties with daily tasks were addressed as they arose, such as 
moving the microwave to another location for easier access and the eventual 
relocation of TUMS® to the kitchen. 
• There was a lack of caregiver assistance after the adult day program, when Mrs. Rose 
was fatigued. The staff transporting Mrs. Rose home ensured she entered the home 
safely but did not assist with in-home tasks. 
Unsafe actions and decisions of Mrs. Rose, family, occupational therapist, agency providing 
PSW services, and CCAC combined with contributing latent conditions at all four levels of 
the Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation and resulted in this adverse event. 
3.4.7 Mrs. Bee (ID 16383)  
Mrs. Bee, an 84 year old living with her husband, fell forward while walking to the kitchen 
and holding onto her wheelchair at 22:30 on May 24, 2012. Mrs. Bee had had cataract 
surgery the week before her fall that caused extra stress on her husband and herself. The 
couple had been interdependent on one another, and the eye surgery caused increase in Mrs. 
Bee’s dependence on the husband, who also had multiple health issues. On the night of the 
fall, Mrs. Bee felt guilty, and although tired, she wanted to help her husband in the kitchen 
before going to bed. She tripped on her feet while walking and holding onto AMG Airgo® 
transport wheelchair. The transport wheelchair moved too far ahead, and she fell forward. 
Later the same night, the husband took her to the emergency department, because Mrs. Bee 
was unable to transfer out of her bed due to severe pain in her side. 
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Using the Systemic Falls Investigative Method (SFIM), multiple contributing factors 
were identified, including deficiencies within all four levels of the Swiss Cheese Model of 
Accident Causation. 
• Mrs. Bee had a number of health related preconditions which contributed to the fall. 
They were: macular degeneration in addition to the recent cataract surgery; a  fall 
three years ago which resulted in fractured vertebrae and back pain that caused 
muscle spasms when her activity level was too high;  poor mobility, and decreased 
strength. On the night of the fall Mrs. Bee was tired and irritable. 
• Mrs. Bee‘s actions and decisions also contributed: she ambulated around the house 
holding a transport wheelchair; she discontinued her physical therapy exercises; she 
decided to not follow up with a referral to a pain management clinic; and after her 
cataract surgery she carried on with most daily activities without asking for increased 
assistance from other her children, friends, or the Community Care Access Centre. 
• Family physician and ophthalmologist assumed that Mrs. Bee will be able to manage 
daily activities after her cataract surgery with her current level of support. Options for 
in-home help to decrease the burden on Mrs. Bee and her elderly husband after 
surgery were not reviewed. Mrs. Bee was of the understanding that being extra 
cautious after her eye surgery would be enough to keep her safe. The elderly couple 
was interdependent on each other for daily functioning, and the couple’s strategy for 
completing tasks together was disrupted after Mrs. Bee’s reduced ability to contribute 
post eye surgery. 
• Standard practice for post cataract surgery home support services was that CCAC 
does not get involved as long as the operated individual was physically capable of 
administering the post-surgery eye drops. In addition, CCAC services were mandated 
only for personal care assistance, such as bathing. Although Mrs. Bee’s husband was 
able to assist with administration of eye drops, his own health issues prevented his 
greater involvement in everyday household activities. After a week of administering 
eye drops four times a day, in addition to the regular household tasks, he reached his 
limit. The couple became stressed and irritable with each other, which increased Mrs. 
Bee’s fall risk because she attempted to perform activities when fatigued and beyond 
her limits.  
45 
 
 
• Her son and daughter continued with original level of support for this inter-dependent 
couple; son visited as needed to help with home maintenance issues, and daughter 
came biweekly to clean the home. After the cataract surgery the co-dependent balance 
changed for Mr. and Mrs. Bee, but their increased need for assistance was not 
communicated to their social network. This lack of support increased the stressors 
leading to the fall. 
• Mrs. Bee chose to use a transport wheelchair for mobility inside the house since it 
allowed her to sit and foot propel herself around the home when her back ached. She 
did not want to have a walker in addition to this wheelchair. She was concerned about 
increasing her fall risk due to too many pieces of equipment to potential to trip on 
them with her decreased vision. She was unaware of another possible mobility aid; 
namely walker-transport wheelchair combo, which combines the features of the 
transport wheelchair (safely seated while moving) with rollator walker features (brake 
levers at the handles to use when walking with the aid). Health care equipment 
vendors rarely marketed the walker-transport wheelchair at senior events, as they 
perceived this mobility aid to be a specialty item, requested by therapists for clients. 
However, the walker-transport wheelchair combo was a good and safe alternative for 
seniors like Mrs. Bee. 
• As with most assistive devices obtained second hand, a user manual did not 
accompany the transport wheelchair when Mrs. Bee got it from a family member. The 
original instructions for the transport wheelchair instructed the user to have assistance 
of another person to apply brakes before transfers and to not use the chair as a rollator 
walker, which is what Mrs. Bee did. When instructions do not accompany an assistive 
device, the risk of inappropriate use of that device increases creating an added safety 
risk. 
• Transport wheelchairs lack permanent safety labels. The transport wheelchair 
manufacturer did supply a safety instructions page with new transport wheelchairs but 
not a permanent safety label attached on the assistive device.  
Unsafe actions and decisions of Mrs. Bee, family, and doctors combined with contributing 
latent conditions at all four levels of the Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation and 
resulted in this adverse event. 
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3.5 Identified Contributing Factors 
The SFIM investigations revealed numerous contributing factors for each AE. The 
contributing factors were temporally linked and successive, leading from one into another 
and involved factors at each of four levels of the Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation. 
The Sequence of Events (SOE) diagrams, included in each case study report (Appendices K-
R), established the timeline of the events that led up to the impact and linked the contributing 
factors (ovals) to each safety significant event (bolded rectangles). The Swiss Cheese Model 
of Accident Causation summary table is also included in case study report for each 
investigation (Appendices K-R). It specifies the layer of defense (unsafe acts and decisions, 
preconditions, supervision, and organizational level) for each contributing factor.  
An average of 35 (range of 22-47) contributing factors (CFs) was identified in each 
case study. A total of 280 factors were found over the eight cases. Most of the factors were 
preconditions, average 15 (total 120, range 9-23); followed by Acts and Decisions, average 
10 (total 76, range 7-12); Supervision, average 7 (total 58, range 2-13); and Organizational 
Factors, average 5 (total 40, range 2-9). When all repetitions were eliminated, there were a 
total of 247 unique factors; 68 Acts and Decisions, 101 preconditions, 41 Supervision, and 37 
Organizational. The eight Swiss Cheese tables of contributing factors were used in content 
analysis for identification of between-cases similarities. 
3.6 Content Analysis Results 
In this section the researcher first reflects on the process of establishing codes of patterns and 
similarities, followed by a summary of the four emerging themes associated with safety of 
care- dependent community dwelling older adults. 
3.6.1 Coding List Formation 
The first step of coding list formation was completed independently by three researchers 
(DG, AZ, and AS) on the full data set (DG and AZ) or half the data set (AS) and it produced 
15 main codes. Seven were stand-alone codes and eight were further divided into 2-5 sub-
codes. Once the independent lists of draft codes were consolidated, the research team met to 
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discuss discrepancies and come to consensus on unresolved issues. The second round of 
coding was completed by two researchers (DG and AZ) on the full dataset and produced only 
minor discrepancies, primarily related to some the sub-codes. Six codes required 
consolidation with other codes to tighten up and create definitive boundaries between the 
codes. The list was shortened to 10 main codes, seven of which had 2-4 sub-codes (Appendix 
S). Every contributing factor was coded into one of the generated codes. The code “other” 
included only three of the 280 contributing factors 
3.6.2 Overarching Themes  
Through inductive analysis of the coded dataset, four main themes emerged to complete the 
puzzle of safety breakdowns for care-dependent older adults and their caregivers who age in 
place. These themes relate not only to the ‘what’, but in using a systemic investigation 
method, the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of each event are also discovered. Each of the codes from the 
analysis process contributed a piece of the puzzle, demonstrating how for these seven 
individuals the defense layers described by the Swiss Cheese Accident Causation Model did 
not provide sufficient protection. There were holes in the defense layers. Safety was 
compromised and resulted in an AE. The four themes that emerged from these codes relate to 
the safety breakdowns that occur while aging-in-place, and will need to be ameliorated for 
society to find solutions to these breakdowns. The themes are:  
• Everyday living has become risky,  
• Limitations with supervision,  
• Disconnects within the system, and  
• Poor safety risk identification and follow-up. 
3.6.2.1 Everyday Living has Become Risky 
Care-dependent older persons aging in place and their caregivers were performing ordinary, 
routine everyday activities, such as stirring up the stuffing, opening window blinds, opening 
bedroom window, entering the home, cleaning the house, pulling out a bowl from a 
cupboard, picking up TUMS, or helping to put leftovers away after dinner, at the time of the 
fall. However, these mundane activities became risky because they combined with personal 
factors, such as impaired body functions that resulted in poor balance, poor endurance, poor 
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reaction times, decrease range of motion, or decreased vision. The ordinary activities also 
combined with   individuals’ personalities, such as fearfulness, determination to be very 
independent, laissez faire attitude, anxiety, and stress. The normal activities have also 
become risky due to polypharmacy and medication errors, fixed designs of physical 
environments, and the natural world environment, where examples include: limited space to 
operate assistive devices in home, high windows, hard to access storage space, a cloudy day, 
and a hot summer. Several product designs used by the fallers added to normal functioning 
becoming more risky, such as slippery broom handle, a stool that easily tips over, or a 
transport wheelchair that is mistakenly used as a walker.  
In an attempt to do their best to meet challenges of aging-in-place, older adults 
frequently made maladaptive choices. Some had an overpowering desire to stay independent, 
while others refused to acknowledge functional changes that were occurring in their aging 
bodies. Examples here include retaining extra furniture after a move into a smaller apartment, 
laughing off concerns pointed out by friends, rejecting safety suggestion made by family for 
improvement of the home environment, continuing with activities even when fatigued, and 
putting up with debilitating pain. Everyday living also became risky when the faller refused 
help from others and accepted the risk of a potential fall or injury or judged that the risk was 
worthwhile to accommodate his/her personal preferences, such as declining to pay for 
medical file transfer, discontinuing CCAC services, avoiding to see a doctor, not following-
up with medical recommendations, and discontinuing home PT exercises. Occasionally, due 
to lack of knowledge or incorrect information, the fallers perceived their situation as 
unchangeable and were doing their best to compromise, accommodate and compensate. 
Examples here include ‘furniture walking’ in a home too small to easily accommodate a 
walker, reaching into a low cupboard while leaning on a stool because of a lack of storage 
space at a suitable height, using a transport wheelchair because it offers a place to sit and foot 
propel when back pain increases, declining a pain clinic appointment because of a lengthy 
application and long drive to the clinic. At times fallers, their caregivers, policy makers, 
designers, builders, and others involved made a maladaptive choice without realizing that 
long term consequences of their choice could be unsafe. Some examples of individuals who 
had the full intention of doing the right thing, and were unaware of the potentially risky 
consequences, are: compensating for blurred vision by slowing down, declining CCAC home 
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support service at time of hospital discharge, introducing an electric lift chair to help with sit-
to-stand transfers, prescribing a new dose of medication, or designing a kitchen with a 
difficult to reach cupboard. It was the combination of personal factors, environmental factors, 
and maladaptive choices that contributed to increased safety risk of ordinary everyday tasks 
for care dependent older persons and their caregivers. 
3.6.2.2 Limitations With Supervision 
Limitations in supervision, from both informal and formal care providers, increased the 
safety risk for older persons and the potential for occurrence of AEs. Limitations of informal 
caregiver’s availability contributed to many of the investigated falls. Some older persons had 
no children or spouse to consistently monitor their functional and cognitive decline or 
question their safety choices.  When children or siblings were present, they did not always 
have the time to assist as often as needed due to their own family and work commitments, 
such as an ill husband, a daughter getting married, or full time work. Some family members 
lived out of the area and, although willing to assist, were not consistently accessible for 
provision of care. For the co-dependent couple, the partner had his own health issues 
affecting his functional abilities, creating an interdependency balance that was tipped 
unfavourably when something new, such as cataract surgery, occurred. 
Supervision limitations of formal caregivers were related to the workload and 
scheduling realities of formal caregivers. CCAC case managers’ schedules did not allow 
follow-up on patients who declined services at the time of hospital discharge. PSW 
scheduling policies prevented consistent timing of PSW visits, leading to strained 
relationships with the care recipient and cancelations of services by the care recipient.  
Supervision supports were also found to be ineffectual for decreasing the risk of an 
AE. Both formal and informal caregivers yielded to the older person’s choices to avoid being 
paternalistic or when unable to persuade the older individual to accept a safer alternative. 
This is well described in the words of one son-in-law caregiver, who was concerned about a 
perceived push to have his mother-in-law (who fired all her PSW support services) admitted 
to LTC because of past falls: 
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“I don’t know if there is any real way you could prevent or improve [safety for 
community seniors][…] because there is still an independent minded person…it is 
just something that’s going to happen. You can’t rubber pad all the walls and all the 
furniture you know…you have to be careful, when you start thinking of ways to help 
them [independent older adults] because sometimes you take away their 
independence and that makes them more resistive and makes them angry […] so if 
you can help them to keep some of their independence, that’s what we need to be 
doing…I don’t blame them one bit [for taking risks, firing workers, trying to keep 
control].” (Mrs. Rose’s son-in-law) 
Those supervising older adults frequently tried to help the elder maintain some 
independence, even if that meant accepting greater risk. Other examples of ineffectual formal 
and informal supervision and yielding to an older adult’s preference included: a physician 
accepting the new elderly patient without a medical file transfer, family yielding to the 
elder’s desire to keep extra furniture that was cluttering the new apartment, friends not 
intervening when they witnessed bizarre behavior from an elderly person slipping into 
cognitive decline, CCAC manager erring on the side of caution when cognitive capacity of a 
client was  questioned, family/doctor/ therapist being unable to convince the faller or enforce 
faller’s compliance with healthcare recommendations. Many of the caregivers were willing to 
accept a certain level of risk in order to help the older person achieve the goal of aging-in-
place, but this yielding also increased the likelihood of an AE occurrence.  
3.6.2.3 Disconnects Within the System 
Disconnects between older persons and their support systems, as well as disconnects between 
the different members of the support systems, contributed to the investigated falls. 
Incomplete, lacking or inadequate communication was a powerful factor that contributed to 
disconnect in the support system. Communication was incomplete when there was an 
unrealistic expectation to recall instructions, which led to poor follow-up by the participant or 
caregiver. For example, only verbal instructions were given by the doctor to the older adult 
and by the pharmacist to the caregiver without written reminders; instructions to contact the 
CCAC if the elder’s care needs change were given at the time of hospital discharge when 
older adults are overwhelmed with the amount of instructions they receive; occupational 
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therapist reviewed fall prevention tips with the older adult one time, on the day of initial 
assessment, and were not reviewed further.  
Communication was lacking when information was not available, when it was not 
transferred from one health care provider to another, when it was not quickly accessible, or 
simply was not passed on by the older adult. Poor care transitions and poor discharge plans 
also lead to poor communication. Examples from investigated case studies include: changes 
in health status were not communicated by the older adult to his caregivers because he 
assumed that what he felt was normal; medical file from previous physician was not 
transferred to the new physician, limiting to the knowledge about the past medical history; 
access to electronic record of current medications was unavailable; instructions on how to 
use newly prescribed medication was not conveyed to the older adult by her caregiver; family 
doctor was not informed that CCAC discharged a patient at high safety risk; a patient with 
potential for continued deterioration and increased fall risk was discharged from the hospital 
without a plan for follow-up by the formal healthcare system.  
Poor communication about available resources from support agencies resulted in 
misinformation and lack of awareness. Examples include: benefits of pain clinic were not 
explained or evident to the older person when she received the lengthy referral application in 
the mail, media messages on fall prevention in the local newspaper initiated by the local 
Health Unit were not noticed by the older adult who read the paper daily, community 
services for supporting individuals with declining cognitive abilities were unknown to 
faller’s friends, benefits of exercise programs for maintenance of physical abilities  were not 
evident to some of the older adults or their caregivers.  
The last systemic disconnect identified was that home services, which were meant to 
improve the older person’s life, ended up disrupting his/her life. The lack of flexibility and 
rigidity in provision of support from the CCAC resulted in rejection of the services that did 
not match the lifestyle and needs of the older care recipient. In one case, a client was not 
allowed to dress until PSW arrived to provide care. However, the PSW’s arrival time was 
inconsistent and spanned between 8 – 11 am. After spending several mornings in a 
nightgown waiting to start her day until 11 am, the care recipient refused further service and 
had her family come daily. The PSW services were strictly guided by a CCAC care plan that 
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did not accommodate for client’s personal schedule or preference. In addition, an atmosphere 
of reprimand kept care recipients compliant and quiet. For example, if the PSW was 
scheduled to give a bath on a certain day, the older adult felt obliged to have the bath, even if 
the bath was not wanted, because the care recipient was under the perception that the PSW 
services would be cut off if he/she did not follow the prescribed plan.  
These system-wide disconnects were directly linked to the contributing factors in 
investigated AEs. In the words of Mrs. Bee, whose fractured rib was initially missed during 
her ER visit and who had to make multiple calls to the CCAC to receive much needed PSW 
support twice a day: 
 “My own experience right now is that somehow the client gets lost in the shuffle and 
it wasn’t meant to be that way, and no one person is doing that. It’s just we haven’t 
got a system smooth enough […] I was not impressed with what was happening to me 
[…]. I know they [the CCAC/LHIN] are going through struggles and a lot of changes, 
but because of that and trying to follow the rules, people [care recipients] are getting 
lost a little bit…and that’s when the health care system gets costly, because it 
shouldn’t have happened in the first place.” (Mrs. Bee) 
 “People are getting lost a little bit…” does not just apply to care-dependent older 
adults who get ‘lost’ in the system’s service cracks, but disconnects in the system also mean 
that family members, friends, agencies, health organizations, and policy makers who support 
and cater to older adults get ‘lost a little bit’ too.   
3.6.2.4 Poor Safety Risk Identification and Follow-Up 
The inability of the larger societal system, health care system, as well as family and friends to 
recognize safety risks for older adults, or to correctly manage known safety risks, contributed 
to falls for the participants in this study. Inadequate policies for assurance of the safety of 
older persons, minimal involvement from support systems, and changeable physical 
environmental factors that do not meet the needs of the older person all relate to this theme of 
poor safety risk identification and follow-up.  
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Society seems to have a laissez faire attitude towards the safety of older persons 
living independently in community. An example of this casual approach was the lack of 
adequate policies for supportive housing, which is predominantly utilized by the elderly, 
resulting in apartments that had design features that do not match the abilities of older adults 
with health issues.  This study uncovered that an older building located in a naturally 
occurring retirement community and designated for supportive housing: 1. had high windows 
with latches that were very difficult for an elderly person to open; 2. did not have 
independent thermostat to regulate bedroom temperature thereby requiring the elderly 
resident to open a window when room was too hot; 3. had narrow bathroom doors that did 
not allow an average width rollator walker to fit through; and 4. had a baseboard heater that 
created a high step between living room and the balcony.  
Housing architecture and interior design problems were not exclusive to older 
buildings but occurred in the newly built apartment buildings too. Insufficient building codes 
for publicly funded housing designated for older adults resulted in a newly built apartment 
building with design features that did not meet the long-term needs of senior residents who 
want to age-in-place. For example: windows latches were too high, storage space options in 
the kitchen were either too high or too low, and fiberglass tub surrounds lacked pre-installed 
grab bars. The local housing authority and the builder were both satisfied that the building 
met the building codes, and it did. The building was fully accessible, and the ground floor 
apartment units, dedicated to persons with disabilities, were fully wheelchair accessible. 
However, the housing authority and builder did not consider specific needs of older adults, 
which are different from the needs of persons with disabilities or needs of the general adult 
population. They were unaware that casement windows are easier to manage because these 
windows have a crank handle for opening that is positioned low; a pantry cupboard for 
kitchen storage is a more accessible option; and grab bars pre-installed in the bathroom 
would have safety benefits for all the older residents.  
Other examples of how formal societal support system failed to recognize and safely 
manage safety risks for an older person were: a lack of a policy and procedure to allow the 
family doctor to monitor an individual who did not have close family but was experiencing  
considerable cognitive decline; the common practice of renewing prescription medications 
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over the phone with the pharmacist for extended periods of time; and the practice of waiting 
for an individual to be hospitalized to assess her cognitive capacity rather than contesting it 
while she is living in community. Three other interesting examples of systemic issues that 
lead to increased safety risks are: the practice of doctors’ offices to charge the patient $70 for 
medical file transfer from one physician to another which,  if patient refuses to pay, means 
that new physician will not have a complete health history; the lack of permanently attached 
safety instructions to follow along with donated assistive devices and home health 
equipment; and lack of training opportunities on how to use donated assistive devices.   
In some case studies, marginal involvement of formal support systems contributed to 
poor risk identification and management. This occurred in situations when only basic 
requirements were completed by formal as well as informal supports, and more critical 
evaluation of an older person’s situation was overlooked. Examples include: pharmacist 
assumed that the doctor explained a medication change (e.g., stop old dosage and start new 
dosage of the same medication) to the patient and filled a prescription without clarifying with 
the doctor; a family member avoided getting involved in the caregiving of his aunt out of fear 
that he might be perceived as “snoopy”, even  though the aunt exhibited unusual behaviors 
related to cognitive decline;  a doctor ended a visit with a patient at high risk of cognitive 
decline without completing a cognitive screening; fall prevention education programs 
provided by occupational therapists and the local Health Unit were not reaching their target 
population in an effective way to change behaviours of older adults;  instructions provided by 
the hospital on how to manage safety after eye surgery were vague and illness specific.   
When indoor environments were arranged in ways that challenged the function of 
older persons, and formal and informal supervisors did not recognize the hazard or address 
the hazard in a timely manner, this led to AEs. For example: the landlord of the building 
inhabited by high number of seniors in advanced age did not adjust the position of window 
blinds pull cords to allow easier access and use; and the family and CCAC support workers 
left TUMS® that were regularly used by the senior on a shelf that was difficult to access. 
Poor safety risk identification and management directly related to the investigated AEs. 
Clearly, falls of community dwelling care dependent seniors and their caregivers are 
complex events. For each fall over 30 contributing factors at all levels within the system were 
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identified. Any meaningful change and improvements of safety in this population will have 
to arise from innovative system-wide far-reaching falls prevention programs.  
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Chapter 4  
4 Discussion 
In this study, eight case studies were conducted to examine factors that contributed to AEs in 
care-dependent community living older adults and their caregivers. All of the falls 
investigated involved adults over the age of 83 years. Only one case involved a caregiver. 
Over 240 factors were identified as contributors to these falls, each representing a hole in one 
of the safety defense layers of the Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation. When holes 
on all four defense layers linked, safety barriers were breached and culminated in the fall of 
the older person. Some of the factors were sharp-end factors and had a direct connection to 
the AE, such as bending over with a stool for support, but others were latent factors, such as 
influence of blood pressure medication and poor storage space options, and represented the 
proverbial ‘accident waiting to happen’. Cross-case analysis of the contributing factors from 
each case was completed and four distinct themes related to safety of older adults emerged.  
At first glance it would appear that the identified overarching themes: Everyday living 
has become risky, Limitations with supervision, Disconnects within the system, and Poor risk 
identification and follow-up add nothing startlingly new. Previous literature has reported that 
the person-related factors of those requiring care will put these individuals at increased risk 
for harm. Johnson (2006) found that clients contributed to 30% of AEs found in his study of 
Homecare AEs. Sears (2008) found that 52% of the AEs identified in Homecare charts were 
related to the clients caring for themselves. Henriksen et al. (2009) discussed how human 
factors can affect care and the ability of persons to provide care and vocalized concerns about 
the fact that the health care system expects good results from elderly patients with co-
morbidities that include sensory, physical, and cognitive impairments.  
Lang et al. (2008) have also discussed that competent older adults have the right to 
personal choice and autonomy within their own private living environments, which may lead 
to situations laden with risk, but private dwellings cannot be regulated to the extent that a 
public hospital environment can. They also identified multiple dimensions of safety; not just 
physical but also emotional, social, and functional safety. Safety in community care needs to 
be individualized to each person. The autonomy and choice older adults and families have 
within their own homes requires discussion between older adults and their caregivers on how 
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to balance physical safety while maintaining an older adult’s dignity, sense of self, and 
personal lifestyle choices  (Lang & Edwards, 2006). This is demonstrated in the quote “safety 
for her is maintaining her functionality and independence” (Lang & Edwards, 2006, p. 20). 
Older adults and care providers do not have a shared understanding of ‘acceptable’ risk, and 
this can create tensions between the older person attempting to maintain his/her freedom and 
the various agencies who are attempting to ‘manage’ risk (Green & Sawyer, 2010). 
The literature also provided evidence about supervision limitations resulting from 
dynamically changing family structures, and increasing workloads of caregivers. The 
Canadian Caregiver Coalition has reinforced, in its framework for a Canadian Caregiver 
Strategy, that more women are in the workforce, which limits their time and availability for 
caregiving, and that families are smaller and more geographically dispersed, which limits the 
availability of assistance and opportunities to share the care between family members 
(Canadian Caregiver Coalition, 2008). As well, home care work for caregivers is often 
treated as though it should be straightforward and “accomplished naturally” (Purkis, Ceci, & 
Bjornsdottir, 2011, p. 101). Purkis et al. (2011) described how challenging and complex it 
was to determine how to care for older adults who are becoming frail. Lang et al. (2009) 
reported how the emotional, physical, and social needs of the caregiver affect the care 
provided. These authors also discussed the risk connected with incongruences between skill 
and knowledge level of caregivers compared to the responsibility level given to caregivers. It 
is clear from the literature that limitations in supervision increased the risk for older adults 
requiring care. 
The potential negative consequences that arise from a lack of communication, 
incongruences in communication, fragmentation, and lack of collaboration were also well 
documented. Masotti et al. (2009) identified that the first priority for formal providers to 
diminish AEs was to improve communication of formal providers between agencies and 
within agencies (i.e. nurse to therapist, nurse to nurse).  Waugh (2009) reported that 
partnerships between key services and care providers, both informal and formal, cooperating 
and complementing each other is essential in providing quality care for those with dementia. 
Johnson (2006) found that communication challenges between providers contributed to the 
AEs identified in his study. Lang and Edwards (2006) also reported communication between 
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clients and care providers, as well as the communication between the multiple organizations 
(i.e. Homecare, nursing, homemaking, PSW or therapy agencies) was a challenge linked to 
safety in home care.  
The benefits of an integrated care model are well known; as Chen and Thompson 
(2010) explained “…it is pertinent to re-conceptualize the links between formal service use 
and informal care based on the older adults’ characteristics and then to move towards an 
integrated service system” (Chen & Thompson, 2010, p. 287). Integrated care programs are 
used to decrease fragmentation of services and improve the continuity and coordination of 
care (Wilhelmson et al., 2011). The cost effectiveness of home and community care can only 
be seen within the context of a broader, integrated system of care (Hollander, Miller, 
MacAdam, Chappell, & Pedlar, 2009). Integration of care was seen as a necessity for 
supporting older adults, as stated by Carstairs and Koen (2009) in their report Canada’s 
Aging Population: Seizing the Opportunity. Integrated care has the potential to improve 
communication and decrease fragmentation of services, improving care and safety for older 
adults.  
The need for thorough fall risk assessment and strategies to address identified risks 
has also been acknowledged in research. Speechley (2011) stated that a detailed fall risk 
assessment and treatment of the modifiable risk factors was an important part of evidence-
based strategies to prevent falls. Peel (2011) identified that “despite the availability of policy 
and practice guidelines, there are still considerable challenges on many levels for integrating 
best-practice falls prevention strategies” (p.15). Previous research has offered an abundance 
of tools and education programs to help identify fall risks and to provide suggestions on how 
to address these risks. The Canadian Falls Prevention Curriculum is a four week, on line 
course detailing an evidence-based approach to the prevention of falls and fall-related 
injuries, based on research by Vicky Scott (2007).  Safer healthcare now! (2010) also 
provides a kit for providers on how to reduce falls and injuries from falls.  Although 
available, these resources have not been fully implemented by those who care for older 
adults.  
Although the previously published literature provided an idea of ‘what’ happens to 
put older adults at risk, it did not provide the entire picture. What this study uniquely 
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contributes to the current body of knowledge is a series of detailed case study examples that 
explain the greater system-wide contributors that link up, intersect, overlap, and sequentially 
accumulate to result in an AE. With the use of case study methodology and a systemic 
investigation, method this study provided not just the ‘what’, but also the ‘how’ and ‘why’ for 
investigated fall occurrences.  
Combining findings from eight case studies provided an insight into four themes of 
commonalities, patterns, and shared characteristics between unrelated people and events. 
Everyday living has become risky, not just because of multiple health issues and poor 
personal choices that did not meet the best practice guidelines of formal care providers, but 
often living has become risky because older adults are compensating and trying to make the 
best of the situation and their abilities. Limitations with supervision contributed to missed 
opportunities to mitigate deterioration and provide oversight for high risk individuals. 
Caregiver availability limitations, interdependent elderly couples, and limited caregiving 
involvement contributed to these missed opportunities. Influence at the supervision level was 
limited by a caregiver’s resolve to avoid being paternalistic. Disconnects within the system 
were caused by incomplete communication, which led to AEs. This study demonstrated how 
poor communication can result in unrealistic expectations for recall, poor discharge planning, 
and poor communication of service availability and options. These disconnects within the 
system linked to Poor safety risk identification and follow-up. Multiple players in the formal 
healthcare system, as well as policy makers within the general society, have not yet properly 
identified potential safety risks or the consequences of their actions. For example, publicly 
funded residences that were marketed to older adults were not being designed to meet the 
long term needs of older adults with health issues.  Making a place accessible and meeting 
building code did not address safe occupational performance by older adults. When a task 
cannot be completed safely due to fixed environmental features, an older adult will have to 
make compromises. These adjustments and compromises bring us back full circle to the first 
theme, that everyday living has become risky. These safety themes demonstrate how the 
greater system-wide contributors link up, intersect, overlap, and eventually accumulate to 
result in an AE. 
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4.1 Review of Study Purpose and Objectives  
The overall purpose of this study was to identify the factors that contributed to AEs in care-
dependent community-dwelling older adults and their caregivers with four specific 
objectives. The following discussion reflects on completion of four specific objectives this 
project has set to achieve.  
The first objective was to conduct the case studies utilizing the SFIM to identify 
specific safety deficiencies at the four levels of Swiss Cheese Model of accident causation 
that contributed to AEs. This objective was achieved by conducting eight case studies that 
identified over 240 different factors that contributed to the falls investigated in this study; 68 
at the unsafe acts and decisions level, 101 at the preconditions level, 41 at the supervision 
level and 37 at the organizational level.  
The second study objective was to provide evidence on how the system-wide latent 
factors combine with the actions of people at the sharp end to cause AEs in care-dependent 
community dwelling older adults. The evidence from eight case studies demonstrated that 
safety of older adults who age-in-place is a very complex issue. First, each sequence of 
events showed the chronological linking of contributing factors. Second, every investigation 
uncovered both sharp-end and latent contributing factors on all four layers of defenses, 
symbolically described as holes in the Swiss Cheese. Shrinking or closing these holes will 
improve safety not only for participants in this study but also for other older adults who for 
example live in the same building, use the same wheelchair, or experience slow unsupervised 
decline into cognitive impairment. The fewer and smaller the holes are, the stronger the 
defenses are, creating a safer system. The content analysis also established interrelation 
between themes and reinforced findings from Lau et al. (2007) that the “prevention of 
adverse health events in the home and community requires recognizing the society as a 
system, in which individuals are embedded in complex physical and social institutions that 
can pre-dispose them to hazards” (p. 830). 
The third objective was to identify safety themes from patterns and similarities across 
multiple case studies. This objective was achieved by conducting content analysis, which 
identified the four distinctly different overarching themes of Everyday living has become 
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risky, Limitations with supervision, Disconnects within the system, and Poor risk 
identification and follow-up.  
The fourth and final objective was to discuss the implications of safety breakdowns 
and direction for their improvements. The main repercussions for the safety breakdowns 
found in this study were increased use of healthcare resources, increased pain, increased 
stress for caregivers and care recipients, and decreased quality of life. Six of the eight 
investigated events resulted in a visit to the hospital, with two individuals being admitted, 
and one lady moving from the hospital to LTC. It is unlikely that caring for someone in 
community will ever become comparable to an ultra-safe high reliability organization, such 
as the aviation industry or a nuclear power plant, but the healthcare system and care at home 
can become safer nonetheless. To make everyday living safer for care-dependent older 
adults, they need knowledgeable and effective support systems that will satisfy their needs. 
They also need effective communication between elements of the system, timely recognition 
of safety risks, and serious proactive management of risks to prevent AEs from manifesting. 
Going back to the words of Mrs. Bee “people [care recipients] are getting lost a little 
bit…and that’s when the health care system gets costly, because it shouldn’t have happened 
in the first place.” The people getting lost a little bit does not just apply to care-dependent 
older adults and their caregivers who  get ‘lost’  in the system’s service cracks, but also 
family members, friends, agencies, health organizations, and policy makers who support and 
cater to older adults. Changes at multiple levels of the system are needed to safely address 
the needs of older adults. 
4.2 Implications for Practice 
There are numerous implications for practice that arose from this study. The will be 
discussed here through five distinctive topics: the person level, the primary care level, the 
Homecare level, the provider agency level, as well as the broader society level.  
At the older person level, the most beneficial solutions are going to address the 
personal choices made by older adults that lead to unsafe conditions. Solutions need to 
ameliorate the poor choices that were driven by the strong desire to stay independent at all 
costs and not accepting the functional changes that are occurring. The social norm to present 
oneself in a positive light and not to be perceived as vulnerable prevented individuals from 
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following up with fall prevention, because that was seen as admitting to being vulnerable 
(Gopaul & Connelly, 2012). To maximize success, fall prevention messages need to align 
with an older adult’s positive identity, since older adults do not see themselves as being at 
risk (Dollard, Barton, Newbury, & Turnbull, 2012). Risky choices on the person level were 
also made if the risk was deemed worthwhile, whether to prevent a move to LTC or to 
maintain independence. These choices will be harder to ameliorate and will likely create 
negative relationships if pressed. Each person has a lifelong history of being risky or 
cautious. Unless the risky choice is going to affect the safety of another individual, one’s 
right to autonomy cannot be taken away. Maladaptive choices also happened when an older 
adult was making the best of the situation or in error, when the person thought a good choice 
was being made. These choices were affected by factors out of the person’s control and could 
only be solved by implementing changes further up in the system. 
 At the primary care level, which includes family physicians, pharmacists, and 
specialists, solutions are needed to address the ineffectual supervision that was noted in the 
investigated cases as well as the inadequate policies for safety of older persons. It was often 
small things that added up to escalate in these falls, and it may only be small things that are 
needed to de-escalate fall conditions for others in the future; for example arranging recall 
visits for high fall risk individuals. To correct supervision limitations, primary caregivers are 
recommended to critically evaluate what role they are currently taking to ensure an older 
adult is in a safe situation and how that role be enhanced. Conducting a Failure Modes Effect 
Analysis (FMEA) with a multi-disciplinary team may assist with this critical evaluation. It 
“is a systematic, proactive method for evaluating a process to identify where and how 
[practice process] might fail and to assess the relative impact of different failures, in order to 
identify the parts of the process that are most in need of change” (Institute for Healthcare 
Improvement, 2011, p. 1). This analysis needs to be followed with a critical review of what 
role is practical to take in addressing the areas most in need of change in order to ensure an 
older adult is in a safe situation and avoiding the potential AE (i.e., is it more practical to 
recall high fall risk individuals bimonthly or twice yearly, what are the potential 
consequences of either choice?). Inadequate policies were another issue at this primary care 
level that can be addressed. Some issues identified in cases studies that should be addressed 
are: written reminder, in addition to the verbal instructions, given by pharmacist with a 
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medication change; need for a policy on recall process in the doctor office for those at high 
risk of deterioration or cognitive decline; more patient education regarding pre-cataract 
surgery to communicate the amount of assistance that will be needed after surgery and to 
offer possible local options for acquiring this assistance. 
 At the formal Homecare level one of the most confounding contributing issues found 
was related to the fact that home services that were meant to improve the life of older persons 
did not match their lifestyle or needs. This mismatch contributed to the ‘firing’ of services 
and increased the potential for an AE with the loss of formal oversight. It needs to be 
acknowledged that this issue is shared with provider agencies as well, but PSW remuneration 
is one latent factor that contributes to the agency’s difficulty with consistent scheduling and 
consistent workers, especially for daily visit clients. PSWs in the community are paid a lower 
wage than those who work in LTC, and due to travel time and down time between clients, 
community PSWs need to work more hours for the same amount of paid time. These system-
wide Homecare issues contribute to inconsistent visit times and multiple workers in one 
home creating the mismatch between client need and services offered. Addressing PSW 
remuneration may help solve this mismatch. Another issue at the formal Homecare level that 
needs to be addressed is better communication with primary care, particularly when a person 
with high risk of deterioration or cognitive decline has declined further Homecare service. 
Sending a discharge summary to the family doctor will alert him/her that Homecare is no 
longer overseeing the person and, thereby, allow the doctor to follow-up with the older adult 
and provide oversight. These issues align with recommendations in a recently released report 
from Ontario’s Senior Strategy, Living longer, living well (Sinha, 2013) 
 Implications for practice related to agencies include the following: therapy agencies, 
public health units, and the Alzheimer’s society. The providers from these agencies can be 
more effective in their role of improving the safety of seniors if they focus on effective 
knowledge translation. This study found that ‘home safety’ and ‘fall prevention’ education 
programs and messaging were not being heard by end users. Older adults and their caregivers 
were also unaware of where to access and when to access support when physical or cognitive 
declines occurred. Resources and solutions to improve the safety of seniors are available, but 
these resources need to be evident and meaningful to the person meant to receive the 
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message. A critical review of the effectiveness of education and messaging could ensure 
optimal utilization of resources. 
 The last topic to address in implications for practice is that of the broader society. 
Disjointed communication, inadequate physical environments, a diminished level of 
supervision, and inadequate policies for care are some societal level issues that did not match 
the needs of seniors in this study. The system as the whole would be more effective if a more 
serious reflection on the needs of older adults was conducted. Family and friends require 
greater awareness about the importance of and the need for thoughtful oversight, as indicated 
in the previous paragraph. Other specific areas for improvement are the choice of public 
housing and supportive care buildings that need better designs to meet the needs of older 
adults. It can be recommended that when an environment is designated for seniors, the end 
users should be consulted so the final product allows seniors with multiple health conditions 
to complete their daily functional tasks. Older adults are a heterogeneous population group. 
The majority of those over 65 years of age are very functional, but as they age-in-place, 
many will eventually have health issues that require their physical environment to be more 
accommodating in order to continue safe occupational/task performance. To meet the needs 
of elderly who will age-in-place, in addition to universal accessibility criteria (i.e., for 
entrances, doors, and halls), age-in-place design features need to be included (i.e., accessible 
storage in the kitchen, grab bar installation in the bathrooms, easy to manage windows). 
 Addressing each of these small changes will translate into major improvements in the 
overall safety of our elders. Further research can assist with optimizing solutions and 
determining the cost-effectiveness of these sorts of preventative interventions.   
4.3 Future Research 
To find optimal solutions for increasing the safety of care-dependent older adults and their 
caregivers, future research should take a closer look into why there is a seemingly casual 
attitude in our society when it comes to the safety of older adults. Is this a result of poor 
knowledge translation from research into community health care practice and society in 
general, or a result of heavy workloads or caregiver demands, or some other factors? How 
can informal overseers of older adults become more aware of the importance of their role and 
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be more effective in their role? Further case study research investigating AEs with a focus on 
where communication broke down, how it broke down, and why it broke down could provide 
valuable information for improving ineffectual and incomplete communication. Further, 
investigation into whether training health care professionals in motivational interviewing, in 
conjunction with safety education sessions, would improve outcomes is warranted, to see if 
supervision effectiveness could be improved. Research investigating solutions to address the 
mismatch between Homecare services and client needs and lifestyles is also needed. 
Investigating incidents that involve the ‘firing’ of services will provide insight into the issues 
and possible solutions to address this important topic. Methodologically, further research 
should examine if the recently published Incident Analysis Framework (Incident Analysis 
Collaborating Parties, 2012) from the Canadian Patient Safety Institute is capable of 
producing similar results in less time, while preserving the depth, comprehensiveness, and 
descriptiveness of the SFIM.  
4.4 Limitations to the Study 
 Although utmost care was exercised in completion of this study, several limitations 
should be noted. The first is the possibility of selection bias, the tendency to only use those 
parts of the data that support potential preconceived theories the researcher may have on the 
topic (French et al., 2001). This is related to Stake’s (2005) concern that there is the risk in, 
case studies methodology, for the researcher to pass along his/her meaning and interpretation 
of the event and potentially miss other meanings as the story of the case is built. Use of the 
tertiary participants in the SFIM workgroup decreased the risk of these potential biases, by 
having multiple viewpoints analyzing each case. Writing the case summaries with detailed 
descriptions allowed the researcher to make comparisons and construct new interpretations. 
Each final report was revised by another researcher, adding to rigor.  
 The second limitation is that, as a retrospective investigative method, the SFIM relies 
on recall from participants, and the risk for recall bias is ever present. Humans rarely think 
about how they made decisions or what their mindset was at the time of an incident, and it 
takes the efforts and skill of the investigator to ensure the depth of the story is achieved 
through in-depth interviewing (Zecevic et al., 2007). The researcher is an experienced 
occupational therapist familiar with interviewing older persons in their homes. The 
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researcher was consistently mentored throughout this project by an experienced human 
factors expert and SFIM investigator of seven years, to assure consistency and depth of detail 
in the story across cases. However, because it is an art and science to complete an 
investigation of any AE, it is possible that a different investigator, a different support team, 
or an alternate expert mentor might have produced slightly different results.  
 The last limitation is related to the SFIM, the investigation tool used. Lundberg, 
Rollenhagen and Hollnagel (2009) warn that different accident investigation models may 
give priorities to different factors that contributed to the event. Some may focus more on 
latent factors in the system; others may focus more on the sharp end, immediate factors 
surrounding the incident. This can lead to omitting some aspects of an investigation that are 
important in other investigative techniques. A number of other systemic investigation 
methods/tools have been described in literature, such as the Canadian Root Cause Analysis 
Framework (Canadian Patient Safety Institute (CPSI), 2006), which has been updated to the 
Integrated Analysis Framework (Incident Analysis Collaborating Parties, 2012); the System-
Oriented Event Analysis (SOEA) (Chuang, Pan, & Huang, 2009); the Systems-Theoretic 
Accident Modeling and Processes (STAMP) (Leveson, Dulac, Marais, & Carroll, 2009); the 
Integrated Procedure of Incident Cause Analysis (IPICA) (Ferjenik, 2011); and the 
Functional Resonance Accident Model (FRAM) (Hollnagel, 2012). 
4.5 Utility of the SFIM 
 The SFIM was a valuable tool for identifying the contributing factors and separating 
them into systemic levels. It was time consuming; on average, each case study took over 25 
hours to investigate, consolidate, summarize the findings, and prepare the final report. 
Building the sequence of events (SOE) was a thought provoking process that forced the 
researcher and the SFIM workgroup to examine information from multiple sources and 
generate new hypotheses as additional information became available, to ultimately make the 
best possible sense of the emerging story. The SOE figure (available in the full SFIM reports 
included in Appendices K-R) allows a person to chronologically follow how events build on 
one another. One issue noted with the creation of the SOEs was the fact that duplication of 
the same contributing factor was discouraged. This was done to avoid repetition in the Swiss 
Cheese summary table. Hence, factors that might have repeatedly contributed to multiple 
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safety significant events and potentially had more influence on the outcome were not 
captured. One factor may have contributed to more than one safety significant event, but the 
sequential nature of the SOE did not allow for cross connections to be made. This was a 
concern for example, when the SOE was not able to link how one factor, such as cognitive 
decline identified a month ago, also contributed to a safety significant event further on in 
time.  The summary and the within case analyses did allow for these connections to be made, 
just not as concisely as a visual diagram.  
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Chapter 5  
5 Conclusions 
Older adults require a comprehensive approach to their health care in order to safely remain 
in their own homes and age in place. An intricate system of multiple players, on multiple 
levels, influences care-dependent older adults and their caregivers. When the mechanisms 
that are meant to protect the safety of older adults do not interact adequately, unnecessary 
harm can result. Previous research identified factors that contributed to AEs based on 
retrospective chart reviews and opinions of home healthcare experts. However, to enable a 
more accurate and detailed identification of the contributing factors and how they link 
together and affect one another to result in an AE, it was necessary to conduct a thorough 
investigation; an investigation involving interviewing the affected individuals, their 
significant others, and others who were directly or remotely involved.  This investigation also 
included examining the chronological sequence of events and the factors that contributed to 
safety significant events on multiple levels within the system. The present study utilized the 
SFIM to complete eight comprehensive case studies of falls in care-dependent older adults. It 
provided an insight into how multiple components of the system linked and overlapped to 
result in the falls. On average 35 (range 22-47) contributing factors were identified per 
investigation. Many of the safety deficiencies were a result of small issues compounding 
themselves and escalating over time, ultimately impairing a senior’s safety. Small things 
matter when it comes to safety for older adults. Across-cases analysis identified four themes: 
everyday living has become risky, supervision limitations, disconnects in the system, and 
poor safety risk identification and follow-up. Findings show that while older adults were 
completing normal everyday tasks, their decisions and acts combined with personal health 
issues, environmental issues, and larger systemic issues and led to safety challenges beyond 
their capacity to manage. Supervision of these older adults was limited and often ineffectual. 
This contributed to more unsafe conditions that were not addressed and amelioration 
opportunities that were lost. Disconnects in the system also resulted in lost opportunities to 
prevent falls. This was primarily due to poor communication between components of the 
healthcare system and offering services that did not match the needs of end user. Safety was 
also impaired when safety risk identification was poor and follow-up from family, friends, 
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and healthcare providers was lacking. With hindsight, it is possible to see the lost 
opportunities for intervention, but with the foresight offered from these investigations, we 
can reclaim these opportunities and improve safety for the growing demographic of older 
adults, many of whom would prefer to age-in-place. 
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Appendices  
Appendix A: Adverse Event Definitions From the Literature 
 
An adverse event has been defined in previously published literature in various ways: 
• “unintended injuries or complications resulting in disability at the time of discharge, 
death, or prolonged hospital stay and that is caused by healthcare management rather 
than by the patient’s underlying disease process” (Baker et al., 2004, p. 1679) 
• “any harm to the client that negatively affects their [sic] overall health and/or 
functioning and is the result of care actions and/or inactions rather than the client’s 
underlying condition” (Johnson, 2006, p. 128). 
• an “event or occurrence, which becomes apparent during the delivery of home care 
services and which [sic] have a negative or potentially negative impact on: patient 
outcomes, family or support care and resources utilization” (Masotti et al., 2007, p. 
63) 
• “events which meet the following criteria: “(1) an unintentional injury or 
complication (2) which results in disability, death or increase use of healthcare 
resources (e.g. additional attendance by healthcare professionals, prolonged home 
care stay, or hospitalization) and (3) is caused by health care management” (Sears, 
2008, p. 67). 
• “unintended injury/complication that results in disability, death or increased use of 
health care resources and is caused by health care management” (Doran et al., 2009, 
p. 168)  
• The WHO would like to come to a common definition and utilizes “Patient safety 
incident: an event or circumstance which could have resulted, or did result, in 
unnecessary harm to a patient. Harmful incident (adverse event): an incident that 
resulted in harm to a patient.” (Runciman, Hibbert, Thompson, VanderSchaat, & 
Lewalle, 2009, p. 21) (Runciman, W., Hibbert, P., Thompson, R., VanderSchaat, T., & Lewalle, P. 
(2009). Towards on international classification for patient safety: Key concepts and terms. International Journal 
for Quality in Healthcare, 21(1), 18-26.) 
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Appendix B: Comparison of Six Studies Examining Adverse Events in Health Care 
 
Study 
Adverse event (AE) category/criteria 
used for identification of AE Prevalence rate % 
Baker et al. (2004)  
 
Top AEs identified in a 
random selection of 20 
Canadian acute care 
hospitals. Rates were based 
on 3 745 patient charts 
(excluding psychiatric and 
obstetric cases). 
Overall AE rate of 7.5% 
Unplanned admit before index admit 
Unplanned readmission after 
      discharge from index admit 
Adverse drug reaction 
Hospital acquired infection/sepsis 
Hospital incurred patient injury 
Unexpected death 
Unexplained transfer to another  
       acute care hospital 
Unplanned transfer from general  
       care to ICU 
Dissatisfaction reported in chart 
 
(Note: the list above were the criteria 
used to identify patient charts with 
potential AE, a breakdown of the actual 
events found was not given) 
 
16.8 
13.6 
 
3.1 
3.1 
2.9 
2.0 
2.0 
 
1.9 
 
1.4 
 
(numbers relate to 
percentage of 
charts initially 
identified with AE 
criterion) 
 
Johnson (2006) 
 
Based on a chart review of 
400 randomly selected 
Albertan home care clients in 
2004 (all long term clients, no 
palliative clients). 
Overall AE rate of 5.5% 
 
Injurious falls 
Non injurious falls 
Pressure ulcer 
Adverse drug event 
Mental harm/injury 
Other (hospital admission, LTC 
admission, unexpected death)  
 
 
46.2 
15.4 
3.8 
23.1 
3.8 
7.7  
 
(percentages were 
calculated from 
cases with an AE) 
 
Madigan (2007) 
 
AE rates based on the 2003 
data base of over 3 million 
Medicare clients. Categories 
are derived from the Centre 
for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services’ outcomes-based 
quality improvement 
initiative.  
Overall AE rate of 13.1% 
Unexpected death  
Unexpected admission to LTC  
Emergency care for fall or accident at 
     home  
Emergency care for wound infection 
    or deteriorating wound status  
Emergency care for improper 
     medication administration or side  
     effect  
Emergency care for hypo/  
      hyperglycemia  
Development of urinary tract 
5.1 
1.8 
3.3 
 
2.6 
 
0.9 
 
 
0.9 
 
5.7 
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      infection  
Decline in oral medication 
      management  
Increase in number of pressure  
      ulcers  
Substantial decline in ≥3 ADLs  
Discharge to community with 
      wound/medication management  
requirements  
Discharge to the community needing 
      toileting assistance  
Discharge to the community with 
      problematic behaviours  
 
 
 
21.4 
 
1.3 
 
0.4 
59.7 
 
 
14 
 
4.8 
 
(percentages were 
calculated from 
cases with an AE) 
 
Masotti, Green, Shortt, 
Hunter, & Szala-Meneck 
(2007) 
 
AE categories identified by a 
group of 31 invitees with 
experience and interest in 
home health care (varying 
from front line staff to 
management and academic 
researchers). 
 
 
Injury and falls to clients 
Medication issues 
Infections and wounds 
Client abuse or neglect 
Unexpected death or critical illness 
      or disability 
Caregiver or client unit of support  
      system deterioration (i.e.,  
      caregiver burnout) 
NA 
Sears (2008) 
 
Based on chart review of 430 
clients in south eastern 
Ontario receiving RN and RPN 
services, discharged in 
2004/2005. 
Overall AE rate of 13.2% 
Injurious falls 
Adverse drug event 
Pressure ulcer/skin breakdown 
General decline 
Delayed healing 
Infection 
Congestive heart failure 
Catheter injury 
Bowel impaction/obstruction 
Bleed 
Dehydration 
 
 
24.6 
16.4 
11.5 
11.5 
9.8 
8.2 
6.6 
4.9 
3.3 
1.6 
1.6 
(percentages were 
calculated from 
cases with an AE) 
 
Doran, Hirdes, Blais, Baker, 
Pickard, & Jantzi (2009) 
 
New fall 
Unintended weight loss 
New emergency room visit 
11 
10.4 
8.3 
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This study utilized the RAI-HC 
data of 238 958 long term 
home care clients (2003-
2007), from Ontario, Nova 
Scotia, and Winnipeg, 
An overall AE rate was not 
given  
New hospital visit 
Cognitive performance decline 
New caregiver decline 
New urinary tract infection 
Pressure ulcer deterioration 
New pressure ulcer 
New pneumonia 
New bowel problem 
New dehydration 
7.7 
5.7 
3.3 
1.9 
1.8 
1.7 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
 
(percentages were 
calculated based on 
all reviewed charts, 
some cases with 
more than one AE) 
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Appendix D: Page Given to Family Health Team to Facilitate Participant Recruitment 
 
Sharp-end and blunt-end factors that contribute to adverse events in community home health 
care 
 
Identification of Eligible Participants 
 
 The following questions will help with identifying eligible caregiver/care receiver units for the 
adverse events study. 
 Does the individual speak English? 
 Is the care receiver over the age of 65 years?  
 Does the care receiver have live-in caregiver who provides care for at least 1 activity of daily 
living (i.e., assistance, which can be physical-hands on, or verbal cueing, with bathing, 
dressing, toileting, feeding, transfers, routine medication management) 
 Was the individual involved in an incident that did have, or potentially could have had, a 
negative impact on the person’s health and well-being, and was related to care received or 
provided at home? Suitable events for this study would include:  
a) falls (an unintended landing on a lower level) 
b) injuries due to any cause 
c) medication mismanagement 
d) pressure ulcers 
 Did this incident occur within the last week? 
If yes to all questions, the individual is eligible to participate in the study. 
Please ask the person if they are willing to have the researcher contact them for a face to face 
interview.  
Suggested wording may be:  
“A research study about the reasons why accidents happen in community 
health care is being completed. The researchers want to improve the safety for 
older adults with health issues who remain in the community and have family 
help take care of them at home. The study will involve the researcher coming to 
your home and asking you some questions to investigate what lead up to your 
experience. If you are interested, you will need to fill out this page with your 
contact information and I will give you an information package. I will forward the 
contact information to the researchers, and they will get back to you about 
setting up an interview. You have the option of declining at any point if you 
decide to agree.”  
 
(Usually two interviews will be all that is required, and there may be 2-3 follow-up telephone calls to 
clarify information. All the required data will be collected within two weeks of initial contact.) 
If he/she agrees, please provide the information package (Letter of information [caregiver 
and care receiver] and consent form) explaining the study more and have the contact information 
form filled out. Please call Dorothy at 519-765-5051 with the individual’s name and number. 
 
Feel free to call myself, Dorothy Gotzmeister, for any clarification (519) 765-5051.  (Thank you!). 
 Appendix E: Letter of 
Sharp-end and Blunt-
              
You are invited to participate in a research study. This letter contains information to 
help you decide whether or not to participate in this research project. It is important 
for you to know why the data is being collected, why the research is being 
conducted, and what we are asking you to agree to. Please take the time to read this 
carefully and feel free to ask questions if anything is unclear.  
 
This project will look at identifying what factors contribute to adverse events in health 
care, specifically community home health care. This investigation is being completed 
to better understand causes of adverse events and to improve the safety of 
community care.   
If you decide to participate, a researcher will interview you and any others involved, 
to collect detailed information about things that contributed to the adverse incident. 
Interviews will be conducted in your home. Interviews and telephone calls will be 
digitally recorded and the location of the event will be photographed. We are asking 
for your permission to collect and use the information from your interview and your 
health record for research purposes. All the information collected will be de
(your name or identity will not be revealed) and will be entered into a Systemic 
Adverse Events Investigative Method Database (Falls Database). 
 
If you agree to participate, data relating to your health history and current care will 
be reviewed and summarized
 
Information-Caregiver and Care Receiver With 
 
 
LETTER OF INFORMATION  
 (caregiver and care receiver) 
 
 
end Factors that Contribute to Adverse Events in Community 
Health Care 
 
Principal Investigator:   
Aleksandra Zecevic, PhD 
Faculty of Health Sciences,  
University of Western Ontario 
azecevi2@uwo.ca 
519-661-2111 x 80455 
 
Co-Investigator: 
Dorothy Gotzmeister MSc Candidate, OT Reg. (Ont.)
Health and Rehabilitation Sciences Graduate Program
University of Western Ontario 
ddykstr2@uwo.ca 
519-765-5051 
 
 
. Your case will be given a unique identifying code, 
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Consent Page 
 
 
-identified 
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and any personal information will be removed, i.e., your name, address, 
telephone number. All information about your identity will be kept confidential.  
All information from the interviews will be stored in a secure, locked room at the 
University of Western, Ontario. Seven years after study completion all hard copies of 
data will be destroyed.  At the end of the study (approximately one year), any 
digitally recorded interviews will be destroyed. 
The information in the Falls Database will be identified only by a unique code 
number. The Principal Investigator will keep the master list of codes in the Falls 
Database in a secure location at the University of Western Ontario. The Falls 
Database is managed by EmPower Health Research Inc. and is stored on a secured 
web server. The data in the Falls Database will be retained indefinitely to allow us to 
look at trends over time. The data might potentially be shared with other 
researchers but it will not include any personal identifiers.  
 
Participation in this study is voluntary.  You may refuse to participate, or refuse to 
allow your data to go to the Falls Database, at any time-- with no effect on your 
future care.  If you wish to stop your participation just let the investigator know. The 
consent to participate in the study will be retained at the University of Western 
Ontario.  You do not waive any legal rights by signing the consent form. 
 
If the results of the research are published or presented at scientific meetings, your 
name will not be used and no information that discloses your identity will be released 
or published without your explicit consent. 
 
You will not be compensated for your participation in this study.  
 
There are no known risks to your participation in this study. All records and the 
Database are secured and access is limited to authorized personnel. You will not 
benefit directly from participation in this research; however the results of our study 
may help minimize the risk of others in the community experiencing an adverse 
event 
 
Representatives of The University of Western Ontario Health Sciences Research 
Ethics Board may contact you or require access to your study-related records to 
monitor the conduct of the research. If you have any questions about the research or 
the database you may contact Dr. Aleksandra Zecevic.  She can be reached at 519-
661-2111 x80455. If you have any questions about your rights as a research 
participant or the conduct of the study you may contact The Office of Research 
Ethics at (519) 661-3036 or by email at ethics@uwo.ca. 
 
This letter is for you to keep.  You will also be given a copy of the consent form if you 
agree to sign it. 
  
 INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM for care giver and care receiver
 
Sharp-end and Blunt-
 
I have read the Letter of Information, have had the natur
me, and I agree to participate. All questions have been answered to my satisfaction.
 
______________________________________
Name of participant (Print)
 
 
______________________________________
Signature of participant
 
 
_______________________________________
Name of legally authorized representative (Print)
(If appropriate) 
 
_______________________________________
Signature of legally authorized 
(If appropriate) 
 
_______________________________________
Name of person obtaining consent (Print)
 
 
________________________________________
Signature of person obtaining consent
 
 (each need to sign their own copy) 
end Factors that Contribute to Adverse Events in Community 
Health Care 
 
Principal Investigator:   
Aleksandra Zecevic, PhD 
Faculty of Health Sciences,  
University of Western Ontario 
azecevi2@uwo.ca 
519-661-2111 x 80455 
 
Co-Investigator: 
Dorothy Gotzmeister MSc Candidate, OT Reg. 
(Ont.) 
Health and Rehabilitation Sciences Graduate Program
University of Western Ontario 
ddykstr2@uwo.ca 
519-765-5051 
e of the study explained to 
   
 
  ---------------------------
      Date 
   
 
  ---------------------------
representative   Date
  
 
  ---------------------------
    Date 
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Appendix F: Contact Information Form 
Sharp-end and blunt-end factors that contribute to adverse events in community home health 
care 
                                                                           ID Code:______ 
 
Completed by: _______________________________________________________ 
 
Contact Information                                                       
 
1. Name:  ____________________________________________________ 
 
 
2. Gender (please circle):          Male                   Female 
 
 
3. Address:  
Street number and name:________________________________________________ 
 
Apartment #: ______________________ 
 
City: _____________________________ 
 
 Postal Code:_______________________ 
 
 
4. Home Phone Number:  (        )  ___________________________   
5. Briefly describe the incident the study will examine: 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
____________ 
 
 
Please call Dorothy for pick-up of this page—519-765-5051.  
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Appendix G: Mini Mental State Exam 
Mini mental state exam (MMSE) (http://medicalimages.wordpress.com/#jp-carousel-727) 
 
The mini mental is a standardized screening tool that will reveal if an individual may 
have a mild (score 21-24), moderate (score 10-20), or severe (score less than 10) cognitive 
impairment.  It takes no more than 10 minutes to complete. 
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Appendix H: Guidelines for Initial Investigation Interview 
 
Questions for the caregiver and care receiver: 
 
1. Can you please tell me a little bit about yourself (asked of both the care receiver and 
caregiver)? Ask about age, diagnosis, physical limitations (general range of motion, strength), 
functional abilities (speech, hearing, vision, mobility aids), medications. 
2. a) How long have you been receiving care from ____________? OR 
b) How long have you been providing care for_____________? 
3. a) What types of care do you receive? OR 
b) What types of care do you provide for ________________? 
Can prompt about types of care (i.e., meals, shopping, cleaning, laundry, transportation, 
and personal care-dressing, toileting, transfers, bathing, medication assistance). 
4. Please describe for me the adverse event that happened in as much detail as possible. Have 
the persons involved visit the site of the AE and recreate the situation.) 
5. Would you further describe.....…probe for any further details required to complete the F-SHEL 
data collection tool (see below).   
6. Do you mind if I take some pictures of…....the area the event occurred, the equipment 
involved, any injury sites? 
 
Before completing the interview take the participant back through the steps they have described in 
order to confirm the data.  “Let me see if I’ve got it right.  First you….then…and then…..” 
 
Ensure that contact information is recorded for any other persons who will be contacted for further 
follower up (i.e., neighbor, friend, health care workers). 
 
Details required for F-SHEL data collection tool:  
 
For this study ‘Faller’ will relate to the caregiver and care receiver who had the adverse event. 
 
Table H1: Examples of interview topics for components of F-SHEL (Faller, Software, Hardware, 
Environment, and Liveware) data collection tool for investigation of falls in seniors. 
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F-SHEL 
components 
Interview topics 
F – faller Describes the faller: demographic information (age, gender, marital status, living 
arrangement, and familiarity with immediate environment), recent adverse events (death 
of a friend or family member), medical and history of falling, medications currently used, 
acute pain, recent hospitalizations, ability to perform activities of daily living, stress 
(domestic, financial, bereavement), fatigue, sleep, attention and memory, perception, 
decision making,  attitudes, fear of falling, balance, physical activities, alcohol 
consumption, and other known internal risk factors for falling.  
L – liveware Enquires about human to human interactions at the scene of the incident as well as in 
the life of the faller: verbal communication at the time of the event, language barrier, 
body language and non-verbal clues, interaction with others, cultural differences, group 
influences, cooperation, attitudes, anxiety, behavior, apprehension, family and social 
network, supervision and monitoring, decision making, safety and risk management, 
commitment and involvement of family and the social network, real and perceived 
pressures, habits, etc. 
E – environment Includes: (a) internal environment or conditions in which people live like lighting, room 
temperature, floor condition, noise, vibration; and (b) external environment like weather, 
elements, infrastructure (sidewalks, bus stops, unmarked inclinations), geographic 
particularities, seasonal changes, maintenance of facilities and equipment, etc. 
H – hardware Explores equipment utilized by the faller or present at the scene. If applicable the 
following factors can be investigated in detail: use of a assistive device (design, 
reliability and safety), stairs or ladders, footwear (comfort, design), shopping carts, 
physical space, arrangement of hardware, display and auditory considerations, etc. 
S – software Includes any written information such as regulatory requirements (e.g., bathroom grab 
bars, raised toilet seats), manuals, service bulletins, knowledge and training information 
(e.g., assistive devices), automation, equipment licenses (e.g., regulation of safety 
requirements for imported devices), medical information (e.g., expiring dates on 
medications), etc. 
(Zecevic, Salmoni, Lewko, & Vandervoort, 2007) 
Note: This is not an extensive list of questions but rather a guide.   
 Appendix 
LETTER OF INFORMATION 
(anyone except the care giver and care receiver, who were directly involved in the 
 
Sharp-end and Blunt-
 
 
This letter contains information to help you decide whether or not to participate in 
this research project.  It is important for you to know why the data is being collected, 
why the research is being conducted and what we are asking you to agree to.  
Please take time to read this carefully and feel free to ask questions if anything is 
unclear.   
 
Recently_________________,
resulted in an injury. An investigator trained in the Systemic Adverse Events 
Investigative Method has been assigned to investigate this adverse event. The 
investigator would like to interview you to co
that contributed to the event. Interviews will be audio recorded and the location of 
the adverse event will be photographed. The information collected will be de
identified (your name or identity will not be revealed
Adverse Events Investigative Method Database (Falls Database). We are asking for 
your permission to collect and use the information from your interview for research 
purposes. This investigation is done to better understand cau
in the community and improve the safety of community care.
 
If you agree to participate, data you provide will be reviewed and summarized.  
identifying features, such as name, address or telephone number, will be 
removed, and a unique identifier number will be used
identifiers removed) is kept confidential and stored at a secure location at the 
 
I: Letter of Information-Generic and Consent P
 
– Generic  
adverse event) 
end Factors that Contribute to Adverse Events in Community 
Health Care 
 
Principal Investigator:   
Aleksandra Zecevic, PhD 
Faculty of Health Sciences,  
University of Western Ontario 
azecevi2@uwo.ca 
519-661-2111 x 80455 
 
Co-Investigator: 
Dorothy Gotzmeister, MSc candidate, OT Reg. (Ont.)
Health and Rehabilitation Sciences Graduate Program
University of Western Ontario 
ddykstr2@uwo.ca 
519-765-5051 
 
 experienced an injury, or close call that could have 
llect detailed information about things 
) and entered into a Systemic 
ses of adverse events 
 
. All data (with personal 
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age 
 
 
-
Any 
93 
 
 
University of Western Ontario for up to seven years.  Any digitally recorded 
interviews will be destroyed after the study is complete. 
Adverse events will be included in the Falls Database, where it will be identified only 
by a unique code number. The Principal Investigator will keep the master list of 
codes in the Falls Database in a secure location at the University of Western 
Ontario. The Falls Database is managed by EmPower Health Research Inc. and is 
stored on a secured web server. The data in the Falls Database will be retained 
indefinitely to allow us to look at trends over time. The data may potentially be 
shared with other researchers but it will not include any personal identifiers.  
 
Participation in this study is voluntary.  You may refuse to participate, or refuse to 
allow data to go to the Falls Database at any time.  If you wish to stop your 
participation just let the investigator know. The consent to participate in the study will 
be retained at the University of Western Ontario. 
 
Your decision to participate will not influence your relationship with the individual 
who experienced the adverse event. You do not waive any legal rights by signing the 
consent form. 
 
If the results of the research are published or presented at scientific meetings, your 
name will not be used and no information that discloses your identity will be released 
or published without your explicit consent. 
 
You will not be compensated for your contribution to this study.  
 
There are no known risks to your participation in this study. All records and the Falls 
Database are secured and access is limited to only authorized personnel. You will 
not benefit directly from participation in this research however the results of this 
research may help minimize the risk of adverse events occurring to others in 
community care. 
 
Representatives of The University of Western Ontario Health Sciences Research 
Ethics Board may contact you or require access to your study-related records to 
monitor the conduct of the research. If you have any questions about the research or 
the database you may contact Dr. Aleksandra Zecevic.  She can be reached at 519-
661-2111 x80455. If you have any questions about your rights as a research 
participant or the conduct of the study you may contact The Office of Research 
Ethics at (519) 661-3036 or by email at ethics@uwo.ca. 
 
This letter is for you to keep.  You will also be given a copy of the consent form if you 
agree to sign it. 
  
 Sharp-end and Blunt-
I have read the Letter of Information, have had the nature of the study explained to 
me, and I agree to participate. All questions have been answered to my satisfaction.
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------
Name of participant (Print)
 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------
Signature of participant
 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------
Name of person obtaining consent (Print)
 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------
Signature of person obtaining consent
 
 
Interview CONSENT FORM – Generic 
 
end Factors that Contribute to Adverse Events in Community 
Health Care 
 
Principal Investigator: 
Aleksandra Zecevic, PhD 
Faculty of Health Sciences, 
University of Western Ontario 
azecevi2@uwo.ca 
519-661-2111 x 80455 
  
Co-Investigator: 
Dorothy Gotzmeister, MSc candidate, OT Reg. (Ont.)
Health and Rehabilitation Sciences Graduate Program
University of Western Ontario 
ddykstr2@uwo.ca 
519-765-5051 
 
 
    
 
   ---------------------------
      Date
   
 
   ---------------------------
    Date
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Appendix J: Guidelines for Investigative Interview With ‘Others’ 
 
1. My name is ______________.I am a health and science student the health and rehabilitation 
graduate program at the University of Western Ontario. I am doing a study on safety in home 
care. Mr. and Mrs. _______________are participating and have told me about their recent 
____________ (the AE), and I was hoping that you had 5-10 minutes to clarify for me details 
about ___________. (probe for details to about  the sequence of events, and if applicable 
about policies and procedures related to the AE, best practices related to the AE, supervision 
levels at the time, personalities, cooperation, education given) 
2. Is there anything else you would like to share with me about __________ (the AE)? 
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Appendix K: Mr. Dee Full SFIM Report 
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Appendix L: Mrs. Kay1 Full SFIM Report 
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Appendix M: Mrs. Kay2 Full SFIM Report 
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Appendix N: Mrs. Bridge full SFIM report 
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Appendix O: Mrs. Broom Full SFIM Report 
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Appendix P: Mrs. Peters Full SFIM Report 
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Appendix Q: Mrs. Rose Full SFIM Report 
 
180 
 
 
 
181 
 
 
 
182 
 
 
 
183 
 
 
 
184 
 
 
 
  
185 
 
  
186 
 
 
  
187 
 
  
188 
 
  
189 
 
190 
 
 
 
 
  
 Sequence of Events: 16259
16259 1/3 
 
 
191 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16259 2/3 
 
192 
 
 16259 3/3 
 
 
193 
 
194 
 
 
Appendix R: Mrs. Bee Full SFIM Report 
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Appendix S: Description of Codes Used to Identify Patterns and Similarities Among Factors 
that Contributed to Falls in Older Adults  
Code Sub-codes Description 
Link to 
final 
themes 
1. Maladaptive 
Choices  
A: wanting to stay 
independent 
A potentially inappropriate choice made with the 
intention/desire to keep ones independence; not 
wanting to accept functional changes that are 
occurring as one ages. 
 
1 
B: choosing to accept 
personal risk 
A potentially inappropriate choice related to 
personal preference is made in disregard to known 
risks; personal preference supersedes potential 
risk; the risk is judged to be worthwhile. 
 
1 
C: making the best of it  A potentially inappropriate choice is made to 
compensate for something that is felt to be 
unchangeable or to accommodate other choices 
made. 
 
1 
D: thinking they were 
doing the right thing 
A potentially inappropriate choice made with the 
intention of doing the right thing, unaware of the 
potential risky consequence of the choice. 
 
1 
2. Faller’s personal 
factors  
A: body functions and 
body structures  
Includes disease (acute or chronic), disorder, 
injury, trauma; physical and/or cognitive 
limitations resulting from impairments in body 
function or body structure. 
 
1 
B: interpersonal/ 
intrapersonal 
interactions  
Includes any interpersonal relationships issues; 
personalities. 
1 
C: pharmaceutical 
matters 
Includes medication errors, events, and 
polypharmacy. 
1 
3. Faller’s physical 
environmental 
factors  
A: fixed/predetermined 
human-made physical 
factors 
Related to structural issues that are not easy to 
change without construction. 
 
1 
B: adaptable/ 
changeable human-
made physical factors 
Related to the set-up of the environment and the 
items in it. 
 
4 
C: natural world factors Related to physical factors beyond control of 
humans. 
1 
 
D: product and 
technology factors 
Related to equipment and technology used.  1 
4. Inadequate 
policies for safety of 
older persons (laissez 
faire attitude of 
society)  
 
 
A: supportive housing  Relates to the physical features and design features 
that are inadequate for meeting the needs of adults 
with health issues, within a building designated as 
a supportive housing environment for older 
persons. 
 
4 
B: building codes for 
public senior housing  
Relates to lack of consideration for mandatory 
fixed physical design features to meet the needs of 
adults with health issues in public residences 
geared and marketed for older persons. 
 
4 
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 C: identification of a 
person with cognitive 
decline and no caregiver 
Relates to lack of policy and lack of an appropriate 
system to keep track of high risk individuals. 
 
4 
D: additional policy 
topics 
Relates to additional inadequate policy topics such 
as those related to home health safety aids and 
patient medical files. 
 
4 
5. Limitations in the 
availability of 
supervision  
A: formal service 
providers 
This relates to workload and scheduling issues; 
high workload affects interaction with care 
recipients, scheduling affects how a worker is able 
to meet a client’s needs. 
 
2 
B: no children and no 
spouse 
Older person has no one stepping up to be the “go 
to” person, to accept responsibility for overseeing 
regular life issues. 
 
2 
C: family caregivers 
 
Caregiver has multiple priorities; or family do not 
live close by and are therefore unavailable to 
provide regular supervision or assistance. 
 
2 
D: interdependence with 
aging spouse 
Married couples can be reliant on one another, and 
both have physical factors that limit functioning. 
 
2 
6. Ineffectual 
supervision  
A: yielding Giving in to the older person’s choice even though 
it may not be in the best interest of this person 
(i.e., inability to persuade an individual to follow-
up with best practices); avoiding being 
paternalistic. 
 
2 
B: minimal level of 
involvement 
Only doing the basics required, not taking the 
extra step to be more critical. 
4 
7. Incomplete 
communication  
A: resulting from 
unrealistic expectations 
for recall 
Instructions are given but not written out, or given 
when emotions are high or when lots of 
information has been given; can lead to not 
following-up, forgetting to follow-up. 
 
3 
B: resulting from being 
uninformed, 
undiagnosed, or the 
information is 
unavailable at time 
needed 
Communication is lacking because an issue is 
undiagnosed, the information is not available, the 
required information is stored with another 
provider and not quickly accessible when required, 
or information is not communicated or passed on. 
 
3 
C: resulting from poor 
discharge, poor care 
transition 
An individual is discharged or care is transferred 
without a sufficient plan for ensuring that a high 
risk individual is supervised by the system. 
 
3 
D: resulting from 
information that is 
required to ameliorate 
the situation not being 
readily evident, poor 
knowledge translation 
Messages or programs for older persons do not 
reach them or are not well-known about with the 
result that the information needed is not evident to 
the individual at that moment. 
 
3 
8. Home services that 
did not match the 
lifestyle of the older 
person  
 Services that are meant to improve the lives of 
older persons, end up disrupting their lives; related 
to the lack of flexibility and highly structured 
supports provided by CCAC.  
 
3 
9. Doing everyday  This relates to factors that are actions or activities  
210 
 
 
things  that the general public would not have an issue 
with completing; all participants were just 
completing everyday routines. 
1 
10. Other  Items that had incomplete information regarding 
the intention of the act and therefore could not be 
coded; actions that were non voluntary or 
automatic in nature; not a conscious decision. 
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